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ABSTRACT
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requires the
Federal Aviation Administration to integrate unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), or drones, into the national airspace system by
September 2015. Yet perhaps because of their chilling accuracy in
targeted killings abroad, perhaps because of an increasing conscious-
ness of diminishing privacy more generally, and perhaps simply
because of a fear of the unknown, divergent UAV-restrictive legisla-
tion has been proposed in Congress and enacted in a number of
states. Given UAV utility and cost-effectiveness over a vast range of
tasks, however, widespread commercial use ultimately seems certain.
Consequently, it is imperative to understand the constitutional re-
straints on public flight and constitutional protections afforded to
private flight. Unfortunately, although there are a few Fourth
Amendment precedents in manned aviation, they are mired not only
in 1980s technology but also in the 1980s third party doctrine, and
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therefore do not reflect more recent Fourth Amendment developments
and doctrinal fissures. There is also considerable uncertainty over
First Amendment protection of information-gathering—for example,
is there a right to record? Further, there is no judicial or scholarly
analysis of how UAV flight fits within contemporary First Amend-
ment forum doctrine, a framework that provides a useful starting
point for analyzing speech restrictions in government-controlled
airspace, but that comes with some uncertainties of its own. It is into
this thicket that we dive, and fortunately some clarity emerges.
Although the Fourth Amendment third party doctrine hopelessly
misunderstands privacy and therefore under-protects our security
and liberty interests, the Supreme Court’s manned flyover cases can
be mined for a sensible public disclosure doctrine that seems agnos-
tic as to the various Fourth Amendment conceptions: we do not typi-
cally require only law enforcement to shield its eyes. Of course, both
constitutions and legislation can place special restrictions upon law
enforcement, and sometimes doing so makes good sense. But as a
general Fourth Amendment matter, the officer may do and see as the
citizen would. Hence to understand Fourth Amendment regulation,
we must understand how the First Amendment limits government
restraint on speech-relevant private UAV flight. Here we analyze the
developing right to record and apply contemporary forum doctrine to
this novel means of speech and information-gathering. If navigable
airspace is treated as a limited public forum, as we propose with
some qualification, then the Federal Aviation Administration will
have significant—though not unlimited—regulatory leeway to even-
handedly burden speech-related UAV activities where doing so would
reasonably promote safe unmanned and manned flight operations.
The Agency, however, would likely need further congressional action
before it can restrict UAV flight based on privacy rather than safety
concerns. As the legality and norms of private flight correspondingly
take shape, they will inform Fourth Amendment restrictions on
government use.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of aviation is intimately tied to human aggression and
defense. Hot air balloons were invented in the eighteenth century
with the hopes of storming the fortress at Gibraltar,1 after which
observation balloons were used during the American Civil War and
other nineteenth-century conflicts.2 Indeed, Union and Confederate
forces (ineffectively) attempted to bomb each other with explosives
tethered to unmanned balloons.3 Wilbur and Orville Wright became
the first successful aircraft pilots in 1903, but the American War
Department had already been funding Samuel Langley’s parallel
but ultimately unsuccessful efforts.4 The first time that aircraft
were used on a large scale was the “Great War,” or World War I, and
although there were pre-war forays, it was only after the war that
civilian flight for airmail became commonplace.5 World War II made
clear the essential function of aviation in modern warfare; Vietnam
saw significant use of surveillance drones;6 and Operation Desert
Storm and other late twentieth-century conflicts demonstrated the
contemporary utility and efficacy of airpower.7
1. See Teju Cole, The Unquiet Sky, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/26/magazine/the-unquiet-sky.html [http://perma.cc/5TAA-CCRG].
2. See Civil War Ballooning: Interesting Facts and Frequently Asked Questions, CIVIL
WAR TRUST, http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/civil-war-ballooning/civil-war-
ballooning.html [http://perma.cc/C6DS-LFW6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
3. See Jim Garamone, From U.S. Civil War to Afghanistan: A Short History of UAVs,
DoD News, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=
44164 [http://perma.cc/R9WV-USQN].
4. See 1903—The First Flight, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/wrbr/learn/
historyculture/thefirstflight.htm [http://perma.cc/29QG-57EF] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
5. See A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. [FAA], http://www.faa.gov/about/
history/brief_history/ [http://perma.cc/P85S-XMYY] (last modified Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter
FAA, Brief History]. Humorously—and perhaps tellingly as new technologies often stum-
ble—the first scheduled airmail, which included a letter deposited personally by President
Wilson, flew the wrong direction and so not only did not arrive as expected, but overturned
in the process. See  The First Day of Airmail, 1918 , AIR & SPACE, http://www.airspacemag.
com/videos /category/history-of-flight/the-first-day-of-airmail-1918/ [http://perma.cc/R8BN-
5H7Y] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
6. See Garamone, supra note 3. 
7. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-134, OPERATION DESERT STORM:
EVALUATION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN 2 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97134.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S5XY-GQBZ]; Lt. Col. Price T. Bingham, Air Power in Desert Storm and the
Need for Doctrinal Change, AIRPOWER J. (Winter 1991), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
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And so it is that while unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or
drones,8 had their genesis in Civil War balloons and World War I-
era “aerial torpedoes,” and conducted their first surveillance
operations during World War II,9 they came into their own during
the more recent wars against terrorism, including most infamously
General Atomic’s Hellfire-equipped Predator.10 The Predator’s image
is so prominent that when one of us chaired a panel on the privacy
and social implications of stateside drones in 2013, a topic as far
from military application as can be, an industry publication ran a
short blurb accompanied by a photograph of a missile-toting Preda-
tor, and that graphic was supplemented with a polished gray human
skull.11 Obviously it can be difficult to detach our perceptions of
drones from these awesome and controversial killing machines. It
probably does not help that a generation was introduced to un-
manned flight via science fiction like the Hunter-Killers of James
Cameron’s The Terminator,12 and that modern films—including the
airchronicles/apj/apj91/win91/price.htm [http://perma.cc/CE8E-AR42].
8. A few different terms are used to describe unmanned aviation. An unmanned aerial
system (UAS) includes components other than the vehicle, such as ground-based commun-
ications and controls. The Air Force and some others prefer “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA)
to the term UAVs, because “RPA” emphasizes the role of a human flier, albeit one stationed
on the ground. “UAV” and “drone” are synonymous as used in this Article, but we recognize
that some think the term “drone” has an inappropriately negative connotation.
9. Kelsey D. Atherton, The History of the Drone in 9 Minutes [Video], POPULAR SCI. (Nov.
24, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/watch-brief-history-drone [http://perma.cc/6KS7-T92L] (de-
scribing the Kettering Bug). For an extensive history of unmanned flight, see generally JOHN
DAVID BLOM, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2010), http://usacac.
army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/op37.pdf [http://perma.cc/TRW4-9KUF] and John
Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 457, 462-64 (2013).
10. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war [http://perma.cc/3XHH-KDJC]; see also
JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z8MQ-9UDU] (describing the
various UAVs in use by the military).
11. See Courtney Howard, Experts Address Information Privacy Concerns Related to
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, INTELLIGENT AEROSPACE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.intelligent-
aerospace.com/articles/2013/03/Expert-panel-UAS.html [http://perma.cc/EG6K-CSCV].
12. See H-K Aerial, TERMINATOR WIKI, http://terminator.wikia.com/wiki/HK-Aerial [http://
perma.cc/ZCF4-ZY9S] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). For those who are not current on their
Terminator references: 
All stealth bombers are upgraded with Cyberdyne computers, becoming fully
unmanned. Afterwards, they fly with a perfect operational record. The Skynet
Funding Bill is passed. The system goes online on August 4th, 1997. Human
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2015 Terminator Genisys—continue to depict drone killing ma-
chines, both imagined and actual.13
But the reality is that just as manned flight today has far more
civilian applications than military, there is a wide array of nonmili-
tary applications for UAVs: firefighting and disaster recovery,
precision agriculture and ranching, pipeline and other utility
inspection, weather forecasting, newsgathering, mapmaking, real
estate, amateur and professional photography and videography,
filmmaking, sports broadcasting, tourism, prevention of poaching
and other unwanted behaviors, search and rescue, and shipping and
transport.14 Already there is a dizzying array of UAVs either in de-
velopment or on the market, including UAVs powered by the sun,15
UAVs as small as an insect,16 UAVs with integrated cameras,17
decisions are removed from strategic defense. Skynet begins to learn at a
geometric rate. It becomes self-aware 2:14 AM, Eastern time, August 29th.
TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar Pictures 1991). When humans try to pull the plug,
the machines start nuclear war to kill off humanity, and things do not get better from there.
Id.
13. See List of Films Featuring Drones, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
films_featuring_drones [http://perma.cc/DB3L-BP28] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (describing
twenty-eight films featuring UAVs, including eleven films from 2014); Brian Truitt, Movies
Under Robot Attack from Chappie, Ultron, USA TODAY (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/life/movies/2015/03/03/chappie-robots-in-movies/24281915/ [http://perma.cc/3N6J-
Z9X9] (“As artificial intelligence continues to emerge in society—think drones and self-driving
cars—robots consequently are playing a bigger role in the cinematic world.”).
14. The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), an industry
trade group, estimates the American UAV market could be $82 billion for the decade running
from 2015 to 2025. ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), https://higher
logicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/Uploaded
Images/New_Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NWQ-SHYQ]. This
is not to say, of course, that drones are necessarily always the most efficient way to complete
a task. See Bill Theobald, Report: Drone Patrol of Southern Border Ineffective, Costly, USA
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/06/
drones-borderpatrol-immigration-drugs-homeland-security/21342141/ [http://perma.cc/46VT-
JHGM] (discussing inspector general report critical of drone use in patrolling the US-Mexico
border).
15. See Solar Powered Drones: On a Bright New Wing, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), https://
www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21584962-small-remote-controlled-craft-
powered-sun-are-taking-air [http://perma.cc/TQ5L-C8HL].
16. See Adam Piore, Rise of the Insect Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 29, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/rise-insect-drones [http://perma.cc/Y6RN-WNES].
17. See, e.g., Phantom 2: The Spirit of Flight, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2
[http://perma.cc/W7QC-YHQX] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
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UAVs that can autonomously track a particular target,18 UAVs that
will provide Internet connectivity,19 UAVs that take direction from
the tilt of a user’s phone,20 and (of course) UAVs for taking selfies.21
To proponents, UAVs promise to substantially ease work that is
“dull, dirty, dangerous, or difficult.”22 But their promise is far great-
er, potentially democratizing a huge portion of the world—the
skies—previously the exclusive domain of the few. Whereas hobby-
ists can fly some UAVs within their visual line of sight, and public
agencies and universities can engage in some flights through a
fairly cumbersome regulatory approval process, commercial use is
currently prohibited absent an FAA exemption.23 But Congress has
mandated UAV integration into the American national airspace by
18. See, e.g., David Pierce, Throw This Camera Drone in the Air and It Flies Itself, WIRED
(May 12, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/lily-robotics-drone/?mbid=nl_051215
[http://perma.cc/VGK7-E8XA]; Hexo+: The Action-Seeking Drone that Flies Itself, BBC NEWS
TECH., http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28014940 [http://perma.cc/MU7N-TYLQ] (last
updated June 25, 2014, 11:56 AM); see also The Robot Overhead, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2014,
at 11. 
19. See Kelsey D. Atherton, Facebook Says Wi-Fi Drones Will Be Jumbo Jet-Sized,
POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 25, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/facebook-
says-wi-fi-drones-will-be-jumbo-jet-sized [http://perma.cc/7T6G-NL97].
20. See Jill Scharr, Indiegogo-Funded Ghost Drone Has Scary-Good Tilt Controls, TOM’S
GUIDE (Jan. 8, 2015, 1:34 AM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ghost-drone-specs-price,news-
20240.html [http://perma.cc/8PZV-X8KF]. 
21. See Greg Kumparak, A Wearable Drone that Launches off Your Wrist to Take Your
Selfie, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/09/28/a-wearable-drone-
that-launches-off-your-wrist-to-take-your-selfie [http://perma.cc/3269-T44E].
22. See Juliet Van Wagenen, Transport Canada Fuels UAS Use Through Eased
Regulations, AVIONICS TODAY (Dec. 15 2014), http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/topstories/
Transport-Canada-Fuels-UAS-Use-through-Eased-Regulations_83753.html#.VSkxKlyUxAI
[http://perma.cc/A9YL-6ND5] (quoting Melanie Hinton, senior communications manager of
the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International). For a description of some such
uses, see The Robot Overhead, supra note 18, at 11-12. 
23. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/ [http://perma.cc/
9ARQ-53PD] (last modified Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter FAA, Unmanned Aircraft Systems];
infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (describing divergent UAV rules). In 2014, the FAA
made its first limited exception for a commercial use, namely for movie and television
production. See Press Release, FAA, U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces FAA
Exemptions for Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.faa.
gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=17194 [http://perma.cc/4BXK-JU93]; Craig
Whitlock, FAA Said to Be Planning to Let Filmmakers Operate Drones in Populated Areas,
WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-
said-to-be-planning-to-let-filmmakers-operate-drones/2014/09/24/ cea7bc60-4415-11e4-b437-
1a7368204804_story.html [http://perma.cc/33RZ-D7C3].
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September 30, 2015,24 a desire spurred at least in part by such
integration already underway in parts of Europe and Asia.25 And on
February 15, 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took
a first step by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding
small UAVs (those under fifty-five pounds).26 So even if the Septem-
ber deadline is missed, as now seems likely, integration is inevita-
ble.
To opponents and skeptics, apart from concerns about flight safe-
ty due to lost link, collision, and other scenarios,27 UAVs threaten to
usher in Orwellian, ubiquitous surveillance.28 There is no doubt that
some in law enforcement are interested in pervasive surveillance of
public spaces,29 at least when triggered by certain events or unrest,30
24. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat.
11, 73 [hereinafter FMRA].
25. See Joan Lowy, Other Countries Are Surpassing the US in Commercial Drone Flights, 
PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Dec. 10 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/countries-surpassing-us-commercial-drone-flights/ [http://perma.cc/3GHE-PYLM].
26. See Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/44A3-
YDY4] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [hereinafter FAA, Small UAS Notice].
27. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Near-Collisions Between Drones, Airliners Surge, New FAA
Reports Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/near-collisions-between-drones-airliners-surge-new-faa-reports-show/
2014/11/26/9a8c1716-758c-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html [http://perma.cc/3ND4-A8UR].
Those flying drones do not always inspire confidence, as demonstrated by an email sent from
an elementary school hoping to find their missing vehicle. See Wells Bennett, Help an
Elementary School Find Its Lost Drone, LAWFARE (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/help-an-elementary-school-find-its-lost-drone/ [http://perma.cc/VQB2-4AQ4].
Even the White House’s perimeter defense, it appears, is not impervious to the drunken antics
of an amateur drone operator. See Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, White House
Drone Crash Described as a U.S. Worker’s Drunken Lark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html [http://perma.cc/6VY4-DBT5].
28. Ryan Calo was one of the first to predict that drones would spur serious privacy
conversations. See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29,
29 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-29_1.
pdf [http://perma.cc/75Q4-EGWY].
29. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Eyes over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/
sheriffs-deputy-compares-drone-surveillance-of-compton-to-big-brother/360954/ [http://perma.
cc/2UCM-KCMQ].
30. See Jack Gillum et al., FBI Confirms Wide-Scale Use of Surveillance Over U.S. Cities,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/fbi-surveillance-
flights_n_7490396.html [http://perma.cc/AB66-4HMP]; Craig Timberg, Surveillance Planes
Spotted in the Sky for Days After West Baltimore Rioting, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/surveillance-planes-spotted-in-the-sky-for-
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and UAVs promise to make that economically feasible. As we and
other scholars have recognized, cost is an important limitation on
law enforcement activity, so when such resource restraints are re-
moved or substantially lessened, there may be greater need for legal
restraints.31 The Pentagon has developed a 1.8 gigapixel drone cam-
era that, flying at over 17,000 feet, can view an object as small as six
inches, vacuum in a million terabytes of data per day, and track
moving objects across an entire city,32 giving rise to what in 1982
Judas Priest could only imagine in its dystopian “Electric Eye.”33
days-after-west-baltimore-rioting/2015/05/05/c57c53b6-f352-11e4-84a6-6d7c67c50d
b0_story.html [http://perma.cc/AZ6D-G3EH].
31. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 538-40 (2005).
32. Ryan Gallagher, Could the Pentagon’s 1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Be Used for
Domestic Surveillance?, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_
tense/2013/02/06/argus_is_could_the_pentagon_s_1_8_gigapixel_drone_camera_be_used_for_
domestic.html [http://perma.cc/G4NQ-QU3H]; Tyler Rogoway, Drones in Afghanistan Have
the Most Advanced Aerial Surveillance Ever, FOXTROT ALPHA (Apr. 6, 2015, 9:40 AM), http://
foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/drones-in-afghanistan-have-the-most-advanced-aerial-sur-16959
12540 [http://perma.cc/UKL5-AAXC] (describing the aptly named Gorgon Stare Increment II,
which combines images from 368 integrated cameras); Tyler Rogoway, How One New Drone
Tech Finally Allows All-Seeing Surveillance, FOXTROT ALPHA (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:45 PM),
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-one-new-drone-tech-finally-allows-all-seeing-survei-
1553272901 [http://perma.cc/G329-A3D8] (explaining several such technologies and both their
utilities and their dangers).
33. See JUDAS PRIEST, Electric Eye, on SCREAMING FOR VENGEANCE (Columbia Records
1982). The remarkably prescient lyrics include:
Up here in space
I’m looking down on you
My lasers trace
Everything you do
You think you’ve private lives
Think nothing of the kind
There is no true escape
I’m watching all the time
* * *
Always in focus
You can’t feel my stare
I zoom into you
You don’t know I’m there
Muse has written an entire drone album for 2015. See Dan Stubbs, Muse Plan to Fly Drones
over Audiences at Live Dates, NME (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nme.com/news/muse/84578
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And we are all increasingly aware of the potential for government
surveillance overreach. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Con-
gress defunded DARPA’s Information Awareness Office when its
proposed Total Information Awareness program threatened to cre-
ate and mine an unprecedented government database.34 Federal and
state law enforcement agencies recently sought the ability to track
all vehicles and search all arrestee cell phones without consti-
tutional restraint; the Supreme Court unanimously rejected both.35
Seemingly limitless NSA surveillance is debated as a result of the
disclosures of Edward Snowden,36 and we are learning about other
private sector and government initiatives that gather similar
amounts of information.37 In short, people are increasingly aware of
the technological potential for mass, persistent, and pervasive
surveillance, and this concern inevitably will be applied to any
[http://perma.cc/9MM3-NF99].
34. Carl Hulse, Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/politics/26SURV.html [http://perma.cc/F5RR-9GL6].
DARPA’s proposed database would have included everything from internet mail and calling
records to banking transactions and travel documents, and would have been analyzed by a to-
be developed computer system capable of spotting suspicious behavior. See John Markoff,
Threats and Responses: Intelligence: Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peek at
Personal Data of Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12; Robert O’Harrow Jr., U.S.
Hopes to Check Computer Globally: System Would Be Used to Hunt Terrorists, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 2002, at A4.
35. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (cell phone searching); Jones, 132
S. Ct. at 945 (automobile tracking). The Justices were not unanimous as to legal theory—Alito
concurred in the judgment in both—but in each case all nine Justices ruled against the
government. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Alito,
J., concurring).
36. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA,
AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). With respect to domestic telephone metadata
surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Congress has responded with
some reforms. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129
Stat. 268.
37. AT&T’s Project Hemisphere adds four billion communications records per day to a
twenty-six year running database, a pace of gathering only a factor of ten less than the
amazing data gathering of the NSA and Britain’s GCHQ. See GREENWALD, supra note 36, at
98-100; Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing
N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www. nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-
vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html [http://perma.cc/T9LK-2ZFX]. The DEA uses a network
of sophisticated image cameras and license plate readers to track vehicle movements through-
out the United States, and it is unclear how much of that data is permanently stored. See
Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779 [http://perma.cc/QL4G-CFA2].
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integration of drones.38 Thus, bills restricting the flight of UAVs
have been proposed at the federal level39 and enacted in, depending
upon how one counts, between thirteen and twenty-five states.40
However, these legislators have paid little attention to what may
be a constitutional barrier to their efforts: the First Amendment.41
Perhaps this is because much of their focus has been on restricting
government actors who lack a First Amendment right. And perhaps
this is because, until recently, it was not intuitive to think of flying
a surveillance drone as entailing any kind of speech or other First
Amendment activity. Recently, though, as sophisticated drones with
cameras have become more accessible, we have seen a proliferation
of drone flight for photography42 and newsgathering,43 and more
38. See Joan Lowy & Jennifer Agiesta, AP-GfK Poll: Americans Skeptical of Commercial
Drones, AP-GFK (Dec. 19, 2014), http://ap-gfkpoll.com/featured/findings-from-our-latest-poll-
10 [http://perma.cc/66ZD-9DDK] (“Nearly three-fifths of those polled said they were extremely
or very concerned that private operators could use drones in a way that violates privacy.”).
39. See Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, S. 1016, 113th
Cong.; Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, S. 1639, 113th Cong.; Preserving
American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong.
40. See Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU (Apr.
22, 2014, 10:32 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states?
redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states
[https://perma.cc/VM9K-4M3Y] (documenting thirteen state laws); DRONES: Eyes in the Sky,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. nn.87-99 (Oct. 2014), https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/
spotlight/1014/drones.html [https://perma.cc/JEG5-RJBF] (documenting thirteen state laws);
Rich Williams, Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.
(June 30, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-
state-law-landscape.aspx [http://perma.cc/E6Z8-UPCK] (citing twenty-five state laws); see also
Melanie Reid, Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs Regulation Not Elimination,
20 RICH.  J.L. & TECH. 9, 19-26 (2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i3/article9.pdf [http://
perma.cc/LSB9-SUCH] (analyzing state drone laws); Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law
Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State Legislation, __ HARV. J. LEGIS. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 6-10), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492374 [http://
perma.cc/P7TL-DFGC] (same).
41. Restriction on private flight may also run up against federal preemption. See Jol A.
Silversmith, You Can’t Regulate This: State Regulation of the Private Use of Unmanned
Aircraft, 26 AIR & SPACE L. 1, 23 (2013).
42. See, e.g., DRONESTAGRAM, http://www.dronestagr.am/photos/ [http://perma.cc/WLF6-
HX3L] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
43. Roger Yu, News Organizations Partner for Drone Research, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2015,
9:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/01/15/news-media-drone-research-
partnership/21802707/ [http://perma.cc/Z7X2-5R3L]. We even see drone flight presented as
performance art. See SPARKED: A Short Film Featuring Flying Machines, FLYING MACHINE
ARENA, http://flyingmachinearena.org/sparked/ [http://perma.cc/QM7R-8PNF] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015).
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generally, developing jurisprudence recognizes a First Amendment
right to record and gather information.44 Of course, as drone flight
increases, so do privacy and liberty concerns. It is clear, then, that
now is the time to understand the Fourth Amendment restrictions
on government flight, the First Amendment protections for private
flight, and any interdependency between the two.
This Article does so in the following manner. First, Part I briefly
describes existing federal regulation of unmanned flight. Part II
then develops the relevant Fourth Amendment rules restricting
police and describes why such rules hinge in critical part on the
actions of private persons. Although existing Fourth Amendment
precedents address dated technology and dated jurisprudence, from
them can be derived a principle consistent with current trends in
jurisprudence and compatible with divergent Fourth Amendment
theories: generally the police officer may do as the citizen would.
Thus, to understand how the Fourth Amendment should regulate
drone flight, we must understand how the First Amendment pro-
tects private flight.
Parts III and IV therefore describe the governing First Amend-
ment law. Part III examines the developing “right to record,” and
analyzes four potential grounds for delineating constitutional
protection: the type of recording (photography and other artistic
expression as opposed to less expressive material), who is recording,
whether the recording is of public or private significance, and the
purpose of any recording-restrictive law. These boundaries each
raise line-drawing problems, but because at least some drone re-
cording is protected speech, Part IV turns to forum analysis. We
explain the value in considering the national airspace system a
limited public forum, and how thereby applicable standards may
protect the crucial speech and information-gathering interests at
stake in UAV use while still allowing the government to pass
reasonable safety and privacy restrictions. Finally, Part V returns
to what this First Amendment analysis means for restricting gov-
ernment flight pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
44. See infra Part III.B.
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I. CURRENT UAV REGULATION
Beginning with the Air Commerce Act of 1926,45 the federal
government has had some involvement in regulating aviation for
reasons of safety.46 But when two commercial airplanes crashed over
the Grand Canyon in 1956, killing all 128 occupants,47 it became
clear that more stringent regulation was necessary. Hence, in 1958,
the Federal Aviation Act48 created the Federal Aviation Agency,
which would become the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA
has regulated flight ever since.49
The FAA distinguishes between three types of UAV operations:
public, civil, and model/hobbyist.50 Public operations, ranging from
law enforcement to disaster relief to public university research, re-
quire a Certificate of Authorization (COA) that permits flight of a
particular aircraft, “for a particular purpose, in a particular area.”51
Thus, for example, a partnership between Georgia Tech and CNN
allowed the news agency to use a drone to film the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Selma civil rights march via a COA that permitted flight
in that specific location over an eight-hour period.52
45. Pub. L. No. 69-251, 44 Stat. 568. 
46. Safety is of course the primary issue in the integration of UAVs into the national
airspace. See Nick Wingfield, Now, Anyone Can Buy a Drone. Heaven Help Us., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/technology/personaltech/as-drones-swoop-
above-skies-thrill-seeking-stunts-elicit-safety-concerns.html [http://perma.cc/3WGV-KXSQ].
47. FAA, Brief History, supra note 5. 
48. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958).
49. FAA, Brief History, supra note 5. 
50. FAA, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 23.
51. Public Operations (Governmental), FAA, http://www.faa.gov/uas/ public_operations/
[http://perma.cc/EXM5-G5ZT] (last modified Aug 25, 2015); see also Operating Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) on University-Owned or University-Managed Property, U. OKLA., https://
vpr-norman.ou.edu/policies/coa [http://perma.cc/BC74-GBLM] (articulating internal Univer-
sity process for applying for COAs) (last updated July 7, 2014). Law enforcement can benefit
from streamlined procedures for very small UAVs. See FMRA § 334(c)(2)(C). Michigan police
were the first to achieve statewide approval, limiting the need for individual COAs. See Carl
Engelking, Michigan Is First to Get Statewide Approval for Police Drones, DISCOVER MAG.
(Mar. 11, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/drone360/2015/03/11/ michigan-
approves-police-drone/ [http://perma.cc/9YK6-4J4K].
52. See CNN Deploys a Drone for Historic Selma March Coverage, AUVSI NEWS (Mar. 5,
2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.auvsi.org/Mississippi/blogs/auvsi-news/2015/03/05/cnnheli [http://
perma.cc/DPY5-7DKA]. This was the first time CNN used a drone to cover domestic news. Id.
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Civil operations, which include all nongovernment commercial
flights, require a Special Airworthiness Certificate that is available
only for drone development.53 Thus, other than for a recently
increasing number of exemptions54 or partnerships like that
between Georgia Tech and CNN, commercial entities simply may
not fly UAVs in the United States. Indeed, the FAA has gone as far
as arguing that flights gathering footage intended for posting to
YouTube are impermissible commercial flights if the user can earn
any money from the monetization of accompanying advertise-
ments.55 This has led companies like Amazon, which hope to be
early adopters of commercial drones, to complain and host opera-
tions in other countries.56 In a sign of the changing times, however,
the FAA recently granted Amazon a Special Airworthiness Certifi-
cate to develop its drone delivery.57
Finally, and perhaps ironically given the default ban on commer-
cial entities, FAA model aircraft rules—which were for the first time
codified into law with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
201258—permit any of us to fly UAVs for hobby or recreational
53. See Civil Operations (Non-Governmental), FAA, http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_
operations/ [http://perma.cc/RFA4-VEAE] (last modified Mar. 17, 2015).
54. See Section 333, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/
[http://perma.cc/3QVJ-NSA9] (last modified Aug. 21, 2015) [hereinafter FAA, Section 333]
(showing that as of late March 2015, the FAA had granted 48 exemptions but as of September
2, 2015, it had granted 1439). The first six exemptions, granted in September 2014, were for
movie and television production, and those since have included flight for aerial surveying,
precision agriculture, and flare stack, bridge, and other inspections. See Authorizations
Granted via Section 333 Exemptions, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/
section_333/333_authorizations/ [http://perma.cc/9HA2-M99B] (last modified Sept. 22, 2015)
[hereinafter FAA, Authorizations Granted via Section 333 Exemptions].
55. See Jason Koebler, The FAA Says You Can’t Post Drone Videos on YouTube,
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-faa-says-you-
cant-post-drone-videos-on-youtube [http://perma.cc/23YW-2RJ2]. The FAA has, however,
stopped aggressive enforcement that required videos be taken down even if the posting entity
was not the drone flyer. See Gregory S. McNeal, FAA Admits That They Shouldn’t Be
Ordering People to Delete Drone Videos, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/gregorymcneal/2015/04/10/faa-admits-that-they-shouldnt-be-ordering-people-to-delete-
drone-videos/ [http://perma.cc/6NRM-MU9U].
56. See Chris Johnston, Amazon to Begin Testing Same-Day Delivery Drones in
Cambridge, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/nov/12/amazon-drones-cambridge-prime-air-testing [http://perma.cc/35ZH-5LEL].
57. See Amazon Gets Experimental Airworthiness Certificate, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
news/updates/?newsId=82225 [http://perma.cc/D7X6-TZR3] (last modified Mar. 19, 2015).
58. See FMRA § 336.
2015] REGULATING DRONES 63
purposes so long as we follow rules regulating size and weight
(aircraft must typically weigh no more than fifty-five pounds),59
altitude (aircraft must remain within the operator’s visual line of
sight),60 and area (flight is restricted near airports).61 Of course any
UAV flight, as with all aircraft flight, may not be conducted “in a
careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.”62
In short, public operation of UAVs is currently highly regulated,63
and except for vehicle development, private use is permitted only by
hobbyists or, more recently, via an FAA exemption. This landscape
is poised to undergo significant transformation as the FAA begins
integration into the national airspace and as disputes over current
rules are resolved.64 Two moves in that direction are the FAA’s
notice of proposed rulemaking, which permits commercial flight of
small UAVs operated within visual line of sight and over only per-
sons involved in the flight65 and initiatives to explore flight beyond
line of sight.66
But many legislators at both the state and federal levels are not
waiting for FAA action to address what they perceive to be a grave
threat to Americans’ privacy. Indeed, legislators who seem to agree
on little else have agreed to work toward limiting law enforcement’s
59. Id. § 336(a)(3).
60. Id. § 336(c)(2). 
61. Id. § 336(a)(5); see also FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR, AC 91-57, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPER-
ATING STANDARDS (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/ 91-
57.pdf [http://perma.cc/4HPY-4HHU]. The FAA has made clear that commercial entities may
not fly under these rules. See Press Release, FAA, FAA Offers Guidance to Model Aircraft
Operators (June 23, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm? newsId=
16474 [http://perma.cc/T3AH-KS6G].
62. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.13(a)-(b) (2015).
63. See Benjamin Sutherland, A Bumpy Take-Off: Drones May Take to the Skies—Even-
tually, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/21631834-drones-may-
take-skieseventually-bumpy-take [http://perma.cc/6EHV-XM9X] (bemoaning the restrictions).
64. See infra Part III.A.
65. See Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/4AAT-
FAYE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015); Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published/media/
2120-AJ60_NPRM_2-15-2015_joint_signature.pdf [http://perma.cc/A828-L6XV].
66. See Matt McFarland, The FAA and the Drone Industry are Turning over a New Leaf,
WASH. POST (May 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2015/05/07/
the-faa-and-the-drone-industry-are-turning-over-a-new-leaf/ [http://perma.cc/3R74-LKN8].
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use of drones. To Senator Chuck Grassley, “[t]he thought of govern-
ment drones buzzing overhead, monitoring the activity of law
abiding citizens, runs contrary to the notion of what it means to live
in a free society.”67 His fellow Republican, Senator Rand Paul, intro-
duced a bill that would typically require federal agents to obtain a
warrant before engaging in UAV surveillance in criminal investiga-
tions.68
Paul’s Democratic Senate colleague, Ed Markey, has expressed
similar sentiments and has proposed broader legislation aimed at
protecting Americans’ privacy from both law enforcement and pri-
vate use of drones.69 A related House bill was introduced with
bipartisan sponsorship,70 and such bipartisanship was also reflected
in a bill introduced jointly by Republican Representative Ted Poe of
Texas and Democratic Representative Zoe Lofgren of California.71
Laws restricting UAV surveillance have likewise been introduced in
both “red states” (such as Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, and
South Carolina) and “blue states” (such as California, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington).72
67. Brendan Sasso, Senators Fear Drones ‘Buzzing Overhead,’ HILL (Mar. 20, 2013, 7:06
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/289337-senators-worry-about-domestic-drone-
surveillance [http://perma.cc/HXP6-K7UE].
68. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, S. 1016, 113th Cong.
69. “Before countless commercial drones begin to fly overhead,” said Senator Markey, “we
must ground their operation in strong rules to protect privacy and promote transparency.”
Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, S. 1639, 113th Cong. An updated
version of this bill has recently been refiled. See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act
of 2015, S. 635, 114th Cong.
70. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 2868, 113th Cong.
71. See Preserving American Privacy Act, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013). Representative
Poe will continue pressing the cause, recently commenting: 
The Red Ryder BB gun is a ghost of Christmas past because, this year, Santa
gave drones. Here a drone, there a drone, everywhere a drone. Just more eyes
in the sky, and these eyes could be anywhere and on any person. How comforting
is that? ... People are rightfully concerned that these eyes in the sky could be a
threat to their constitutional right of privacy.
Ted Poe, Christmas Drones, TEXAS GOP VOTE (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:03 PM), http://www.texas
gopvote.com/family/christmas-drones-007393 [http://perma.cc/FR2C-Z7W9].
72. See Bohm, supra note 40; Williams, supra note 40.
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II. REGULATING LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
It has been suggested that law enforcement use of drones to
observe activities of a private nature might violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches. A Congress-
ional Research Service report, for example, notes the worry that
drones “will be used to spy on American citizens,” and asserts that,
“[u]ndoubtedly, the government’s use of drones for domestic sur-
veillance operations implicates the Fourth Amendment and other
applicable laws.”73 
At first blush, this assertion might seem at odds with a trio of
Supreme Court cases from the 1980s—California v. Ciraolo, Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, and Florida v. Riley—holding that
the Fourth Amendment is typically not implicated when the govern-
ment uses airplanes or helicopters to observe (1) the growing of
marijuana within the curtilage of a home (Ciraolo and Riley) or (2)
the pollution-related activities on the premises of a factory (Dow
Chemical).74 So long as such observation takes place from public
airspace, said the Court, police are not violating any reasonable
expectations of privacy; they are simply observing what landowners
know can be seen from public space.75 Coming toward the end of a
two-decade development of what is now known as the “third party
doctrine,”76 this can be seen as the doctrine’s easiest instance: if one
73. ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42940,
INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 12 (2013),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [http://perma.cc/SXQ6-LT47]; see also RICHARD M.
THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES (2013),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WEH-T8JU].
74. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also Reid, supra note
40, at 35-38 (examining Fourth Amendment implications of drone overflight).
75. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-52; id. at 454-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
76. The third party doctrine cases are: the “false friend” cases of Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966), and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); the bank records case
of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); the phone records case of Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979); the beeper cases of United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); the flyover cases of Ciraolo and Riley; the open
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retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in what she shares with
a single other entity, surely she likewise retains no reasonable
expectation in what she makes available to anyone and everyone
desiring and equipped to see.
But not only has the third party doctrine rightly fallen on harder
times,77 the Court’s holdings were each able to muster only five
votes, with Riley requiring a concurrence in the judgment to even
get to five.78 And the majority in those cases did not have a compel-
ling response to the dissenters’ complaint that although we may
expect planes or helicopters to pass overhead, we do not expect that
those pilots will intently focus on our domestic and commercial
activities,79 and that this distinction is important given the Fourth
Amendment’s policy choice “that our society should be one in which
citizens dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveil-
lance.”80 The Ciraolo Court brushed aside this “novel analysis,”81 but
even were it novel in 1986, this is a harder claim in 2015 when the
Court does consider programmatic purpose or intent in other con-
texts.82 In other words, as will be developed in more detail below,83
even if police should face no restraints on transportation-minded
flights like those flown by private persons, it would not necessarily
fields cases of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), and United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294 (1987); and the garbage case of California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). In the
words of the Miller Court: 
[We] ha[ve] held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third
party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
425 U.S. at 443.
77. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
78. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
79. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222-25 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 214 n.2 (majority opin-
ion) (responding briefly in a footnote that Powell’s thinking constituted a “novel analysis”);
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 249-50 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81. Id. at 214 n.2.
82. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (describing reliance on program-
matic intent in inventory searches); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-48 (2000)
(considering programmatic purpose in automobile checkpoints); see also Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (“[W]hether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable
search ... depends upon the purpose for which they entered.”); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (contrasting purposes of prenatal care and law enforcement).
83. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
2015] REGULATING DRONES 67
follow that investigation-minded flights, which are quite different,
should be unrestricted. 
Moreover, in all three flyover cases, the Court hinted that a
Fourth Amendment violation might occur when aerial observation
obtains information that is more private and personal. In Ciraolo,
the Court noted that it was not evaluating a situation in which the
state was using technology to reveal “those intimate associations,
objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citi-
zens.”84 In Riley, it stated that there was no evidence that, in using
a helicopter to see if a greenhouse concealed marijuana, police
learned any “intimate details connected with the use of the home or
curtilage.”85 And in Dow Chemical, decided the same day as Ciraolo,
the Court emphasized that the government’s effort to detect viola-
tions of environmental laws was not a case in which the use of mag-
nification revealed small items such as a “class ring” or “identifiable
human faces or secret documents captured in such a fashion as to
implicate more serious privacy concerns.”86
The Riley plurality also relied, somewhat strangely, upon a lack
of “undue noise, ... wind, dust, or threat of injury.”87 But Justice
Brennan, in dissent, persuasively demonstrated those are not
Fourth Amendment concerns, his language presciently describing
capabilities of modern UAVs:
Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust
at all—and, for good measure, without posing any threat of
injury. Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to
discover not only what crops people were growing in their
greenhouses, but also what books they were reading and who
their dinner guests were. Suppose, finally, that the FAA regula-
tions remained unchanged, so that the police were undeniably
“where they had a right to be.” Would today’s plurality continue
to assert that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
84. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3.
85. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
86. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986). “[T]he photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.” Id. at 238.
87. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” was not infringed by such surveillance?88
Thus, these cases should be read in view of then-existing tech-
nology and their facts, leaving ample room for Fourth Amendment
regulation of significant aerial surveillance.
Indeed, within the cases is a more narrow rule that critically links
the Fourth and First Amendment inquiries. In casting the fifth vote
in Riley, Justice O’Connor articulated that government surveillance
does not pass Fourth Amendment muster merely because unrelated
private persons could obtain the relevant information, but rather
only if they routinely do obtain that information.89 Only in the latter
case is it unreasonable to expect privacy. Four other Justices signed
on to this approach,90 under which Fourth Amendment restrictions
on UAV flight will depend upon what private persons do with UAVs,
which of course depends in part on what the First Amendment
lawfully entitles private persons to do with UAVs.
This more nuanced interpretation is reinforced by recent case law.
The concurring opinions in United States v. Jones give the sense
that, however tolerant the Supreme Court may have been of aerial
surveillance in the 1980s, it may be ready to adopt a more restric-
tive Fourth Amendment rule for modern UAV surveillance.91 The
88. Id. at 462-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
89. Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The fact that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any
altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulations, does not in itself mean that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation.
In determining whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy from
aerial observation, the relevant inquiry after Ciraolo is not whether the heli-
copter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, consistent
with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an
altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that
Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.... If the public rarely, if ever, travels
overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage
point generally used by the public and Riley cannot be said to have knowingly
exposed his greenhouse to public view.
Id. at 454-55 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a more questionable move, Justice
O’Connor would place the burden of proving these empirics on the defendant. See id. at 455
(O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 468 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
90. See id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring
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Court had previously held, in United States v. Knotts, that police
raise no Fourth Amendment concern when they supplement their
visual surveillance in public space with a radio transmitter hidden
in a purchased chloroform drum, enabling them to track a vehicle
along a single trip.92 But in Jones, the Court unanimously agreed
that police do engage in a Fourth Amendment search when they at-
tach a GPS device to an individual’s vehicle and monitor that vehi-
cle’s movements for an entire month.93 The Court’s five-member
majority opinion rested on the narrower ground that, unlike the
chloroform drum in Knotts that was voluntarily purchased by the
suspect already containing the radio transmitter inside, the GPS
device in Jones was attached without the vehicle owner’s permis-
sion, and the attaching thus constituted a trespass or physical intru-
sion.94 The concurring opinions, however, urged a distinction more
relevant to the Fourth Amendment status of UAV flight: whereas
the radio transmitter in Knotts could only supplement real-time
tracking by police officers tailing a car on the highway and was used
to monitor a single trip, the GPS device in Jones could entirely re-
place such human tracking and allow tracking on a massive scale.95 
As Justice Alito noted, GPS tracking dramatically lowers the cost
of round-the-clock surveillance, which was “difficult and costly” in
ages past and thus “rarely undertaken.”96 Thanks to this technology,
police could now easily subject numerous people to the kind of sur-
veillance that historically “would have required a large team of
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance.”97 Thus, in
the words of Justice Sotomayor, “because GPS monitoring is cheap
in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by de-
sign, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that con-
strain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources
and community hostility.’”98 Hence, police can now, without concern
for cost or resource limitations, subject numerous citizens to GPS
in the judgment).
92. 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
93. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947, 949.
94. Id. at 951-53. 
95. Id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962-64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
96. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426
(2004)).
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surveillance that creates a “precise, comprehensive record of [each]
person’s public movements,” thereby revealing numerous private
details.99 
UAV tracking raises similar concerns. Such surveillance, unlike
GPS tracking of a vehicle, cannot currently collect data on its own
without aid from a human operator, but that technology is forthcom-
ing.100 And even without that full automation, drone surveillance is
still far less costly—and in many ways, far more powerful—than the
aerial surveillance technology available to the police in Ciraolo,
Riley, and Dow Chemical.101 Just as GPS devices can generate far
more information about a person’s movements than the radio trans-
mitter location technology of the 1980s, drone surveillance can
gather more information from a person’s backyard than the aerial
surveillance of that time, both in terms of detail and quantity,
thereby learning of “intimate associations, objects or activities” and
“intimate details” that even the earlier Courts suggested should
remain constitutionally off-limits to suspicionless surveillance from
the air.102 As UAV technology improves, and solar-powered or laser-
rechargeable103 autonomous vehicles can hover over a city at thou-
sands of feet and gather massive amounts of high-resolution data
from gigapixel cameras, UAV flight may indeed look far more inva-
sive than the GPS technology that concerned the Jones Court.
The Fourth Amendment precedents thus can and should be read
to regulate drone surveillance,104 but from them we derive a public
99. Id. at 955.
100. See Evan Ackerman, Camera Drones that Follow You, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 25, 2014,
13:43 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/aerial-robots/drones-that-follow-you
[http://perma.cc/N4ME-SLG3]. 
101. For a clever analysis of the cost of various location tracking methods, but not including
drones, see Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveil-
lance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. F. 335, 341-50 (2014) http://
yalelawjournal.org/forum/tiny-constables-and-the-cost-of-surveillance-making-cents-out-of-
united-states-v-jones [http://perma.cc/695M-9KEL]. 
102. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
103. See Wireless Charging: Coiled and Ready to Strike, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2015, at 67.
104. As for precisely how the Fourth Amendment should regulate aerial and other public
surveillance, we and others have made preliminary proposals. See Stephen E. Henderson,
Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable,
Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 831-35 (2013) (constructing a
duration-based framework); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L.
2015] REGULATING DRONES 71
disclosure doctrine that police typically need not “shield their eyes”
from what other citizens in fact freely and lawfully observe.105 When
technology is “in general public use” for a particular purpose, the
Fourth Amendment does not restrict such law enforcement use.106
Of course, courts must be careful to closely scrutinize government
claims of equivalence between private and public use of technolo-
gies. If Jones makes anything clear, it is that the use of technology
as a force multiplier can be a difference in kind, not merely in de-
gree: just because other people are of course free to observe my
public movements does not mean, without more, that the govern-
ment may use technology that logs a significant portion of those
movements. Similarly, that people are free to take photographs in
public does not, without more, indicate that the government may
line the streets and parks with powerful networks of linked cam-
eras. Courts must compare apples to apples.107 But if the equiva-
lence is accurate, then, as the Supreme Court recently reiterated in
Florida v. Jardines, law enforcement may act as a private citizen
would do.108
So if the First Amendment keeps open a certain avenue of aerial
observation to private citizens, it may also—at least as a default
matter—keep that avenue open to law enforcement. This may only
be the default because, as Christopher Slobogin has argued, there
& PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 26-27 (2012) (same); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth
Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public
Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 22 (2013) (constructing a recording or magnification framework).
The Court could also look to its automobile roadblock and drug-testing case law and require
that warrantless law enforcement aerial surveillance be broadly applicable, limited in
purpose, and nondiscriminatory, in order to benefit from the checks of the political process.
See Henderson, supra note 31, at 554-59  (describing these benefits of political process checks
and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the same).
105. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
106. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal
imager to obtain information regarding the waste heat exiting a home is a search, at least so
long as such devices are not in general public use). 
107. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 235 (2009) (“What matters is not merely that a particular technical
device or system is not overly unusual, but that its use in a particular context, in a particular
way is not overly unusual.”).
108. 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (citing Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011));
see also Stephen E. Henderson & Kelly Sorensen, Search, Seizure, and Immunity: Second-
Order Normative Authority and Rights, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 108, 114 (2013) (developing this
principle and applying it to exigent circumstances home entry).
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may be special constitutional reasons to restrict government camera
surveillance.109 And it depends critically upon what private persons
actually do. Therefore, we next turn to developing that First Amend-
ment law, but first finish with two brief Fourth Amendment points:
the public disclosure default seems viable even if one adopts a
different conception of the Fourth Amendment than the Court’s
own, and if the Court takes an unfortunate turn and returns to a
monolithic third party doctrine, the First Amendment-Fourth
Amendment connection is merely reinforced.
A. Fourth Amendment Models
To determine whether a particular police action constitutes a
“search” and thus must be reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court uses two tests. The first, recently revived
by the Court in Jones after a forty-five year dormancy, requires a
physical intrusion into a constitutionally-protected area—a person,
house, paper, or effect—in order to obtain information.110 At first
blush, this might not seem generally relevant to UAV flight, but
that is unclear because we know so little about what conception of
“intrusion” or “trespass” the Court might ultimately use, and also
very little about how the legal doctrine of trespass might ultimately
accommodate or restrict UAV flight.111
The second test for what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search—and the dominant test for the last half-century as the “tres-
pass” or “property” conception lay dormant—is a test derived from
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.112 Under this
test, the government engages in a Fourth Amendment search any
time it intrudes upon an “expectation of privacy ... that society is
109. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 98-108 (2007) (arguing that there are
freedom of speech and association, freedom of movement and repose, right to privacy, and
Fourth Amendment reasons to constitutionally restrict public camera surveillance).
110. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-51 (2012); see also Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at
1414 (“When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses,
papers, or effects, a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has
undoubtedly occurred.” (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51, 951 n.3) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
111. See infra Part IV.B (discussing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
112. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”113 Unfortunately, despite
forty-five years of use, it remains unclear whether the Katz test is
primarily empirical, primarily normative, or empirical with a norm-
ative backstop. This matters because, as Justice Alito observed in
his Jones concurrence, what people expect can change: “[T]he Katz
test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable per-
son has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations,” but
“technology can change those expectations” by “produc[ing] signifi-
cant changes in popular attitudes.”114 Indeed, in City of Ontario v.
Quon, eight members of the Court were sufficiently concerned about
potentially shifting expectations regarding electronic communica-
tions that they were hesitant to declare what those expectations
might be.115 
The Katz test, then, could be seen to introduce confusion into
constitutional protection by allowing what counts as a search to
change as new technologies, cultural practices, and laws transform
the way people interact with space and with each other. Some
scholars have suggested that the definition of a Fourth Amendment
“search” should be built upon more stable foundations. One of us, for
example, has argued that search and seizure “are (and were, at the
time of the founding) ordinary, commonplace words” and should
“bear that ordinary meaning.”116 Of course, this leaves hard work to
do, merely placing it squarely upon the Fourth Amendment’s “rea-
sonableness” criterion. 
Others, such as Anthony Amsterdam and Dan Solove, have
argued that the definition of a Fourth Amendment search should
depend not on constantly changing expectations about where we are
shielded from observation, but rather on a (hopefully stable) sense
of how much privacy a free society requires people to have from
113. Id. at 361.
114. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
115. 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The Court must proceed with care when considering the
whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment ....
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”).
116. Henderson, supra note 31, at 544; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 768 (1994) (arguing that “scanning [a] crowd,” even in
public, counts as a “search,” but that such a search is clearly constitutional); Search
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/search [http://
perma.cc/B7L8-6UHT] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (defining “search” as “look[ing] into or over
carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something”).
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government.117 Amsterdam, for example, says that the core inquiry
in determining if the Fourth Amendment applies should be
“whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints,
the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and
open society.”118 Three of the Riley dissenters adopted this formula-
tion.119 Solove has similarly suggested that “[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment should regulate government information gathering whenever
it causes problems of reasonable significance,” which for him include
“people’s ability to exercise autonomy, engage in free speech, com-
municate with others, associate in groups, participate in political
activities, pursue self-development, and formulate their own ideas,
beliefs, and values.”120
Such alternatives, however, are far from self-defining and are
unlikely to be adopted after decades of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence developed under the reasonable expectation of privacy frame-
work. Not a single justice in Jones, which signaled both a resur-
gence of the dormant property-based conception and a potentially
significant shift in how the Court understands the Fourth Amend-
ment’s application to surveillance in public spaces, suggested that
the Katz framework be replaced.121 Moreover, and most importantly,
alternative inquiries cannot insulate Fourth Amendment questions
about permissible police surveillance from being powerfully shaped
by what people expect is routine and acceptable in private
surveillance—which, in part, is determined by First Amendment
limits on what private parties can be prevented from seeing in
117. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1511 (2010).
118. Amsterdam, supra note 117, at 403. Amsterdam adds that courts can answer this
question only if they first “transmut[e]” it into one that is less abstract, and he suggests that
some version of reasonable expectation of privacy test might serve such a role. Id. at 404.
119. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Solove, supra note 117, at 1528.
121. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor did perhaps try to work something like
Amsterdam’s rule into the reasonable expectation of privacy criterion. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that in determining
whether there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts should consider whether
surveillance “may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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public and then sharing with others. It is a powerful default
intuition that police generally be allowed to use tools available to,
and routinely and lawfully used by, others.
Consider, for example, how the rise of Google Street View has
changed what information is available to individuals from a com-
puter with an Internet connection.122 Google Street View allows
individuals located thousands of miles away to easily obtain a view
of a street and the business and residences on it from a vantage
point of a pedestrian on-site. Although it does not allow real-time
observation—at least not yet—individuals can often gain close-up
views of a home’s exterior and curtilage and may even be able to
gather details from their computers akin to those which police
gathered from the plane used in Ciraolo. Indeed, police have used
Google Street View to investigate robbery suspects seen in an
image123 and to help locate missing children,124 and it could be used
in the due diligence required to apply for a warrant.125 Google Street
View has also turned up evidence of drug deals and vandalism126
and has been used by clever pranksters to stage an axe murder.127
It would seem odd for the Constitution to require police to obtain a
warrant before using a computer technology freely available to
others, including the criminals they are pursuing, and this oddity
122. See Street View, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/maps/views/streetview [http://
perma.cc/E98M-XVPP] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
123. See Benjamin Fearnow, Google Street View Images Catch Robbery Suspects in the Act
Three Years Later, CBS HOUSTON (July 15, 2014), http://houston.cbslocal.com/2014/07/15/
google-street-view-images-catch-robbery-suspects-in-the-act-3-years-later/ [http://perma.cc/
3GVT-5RMK].
124. See Google Search Finds Missing Child, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/7820984.stm [http://perma.cc/JW9M-WZWQ] (last updated Jan. 9, 2009).
125. Cf. Stephen E. Henderson, What Alex Kozinski and the Investigation of Earl Bradley
Teach About Searching and Seizing Computers and the Dangers of Inevitable Discovery, 19
WIDENER L. REV. 115, 123-29 (2013) (describing an investigation in which this was not done
and the potential consequences thereof).
126. See Jess Fee, 17 Illicit Acts Caught on Google Street View, MASHABLE (June 24, 2013),
http://mashable.com/2013/06/24/illicit-google-street-view/ [http://perma.cc/DMT4-C3A9];
Alexandra Klausner, ‘Drug Deal’ Caught on Google Street View in ‘Most Dangerous Town in
America’ Camden, DAILYMAIL (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2728491/Former-addict-looks-old-dope-spot-Google-Maps-sees-appears-drug-deal.html [http://
perma.cc/XR7V-RB36].
127. See Lizzie Dearden, Police Solve ‘Axe Murder’ Captured on Google Street View in
Edinburgh, INDEPENDENT (June 2, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/weird-news/
police-solve-axe-murder-captured-on-google-street-view-in-edinburgh-9473780.html [http://
perma.cc/WA2N-QM2T].
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would exist whether one used Amsterdam’s test or that from Katz.
If a free society can survive constant use of Google Street View by
anyone who wishes to use it (including one’s business rivals or
political enemies), why would it not be able to survive use of Google
Street View by police?128
The same intuition would apply to UAV surveillance were it to
become privately commonplace, perhaps proliferating behind a First
Amendment shield. It will be hard for people to argue that they are
unsettled and made insecure by police drone use in a world where
they expect—and have adapted to—being subject to drone surveil-
lance by everyone else. As the Supreme Court said in Ciraolo, such
a transformation was precisely what changed the from-the-air
observation in that case from something once unthinkable to an
ordinary and expected part of life: “In an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable
for respondent to expect” that his land and its uses would remain
unseen from such flights.129 So long as that holding is limited as
described above, it strikes us as sound.
It is, of course, conceivable that people might have different ex-
pectations about police behavior and that of private actors. Even if
one comes to expect (and tolerate) that private individuals or com-
panies with which she is not doing business, and to whom she has
not given consent, are able to regularly track her movements or
other behaviors, one might not expect (or accept) police doing the
same. Just because, say, journalists fly drones to gather information
for use in news stories, and real estate companies gather infor-
128. But see SLOBOGIN, supra note 109. One might argue that there are some kinds of
police surveillance that a free and open society could not survive, and that courts should
continue to treat these methods as Fourth Amendment searches even if private actors gain
the capacity and legal authority to conduct similar kinds of surveillance. For example, if in
the future state and federal laws no longer prohibit individuals from tapping into phone
conversations, and such wiretapping thus becomes commonplace and expected, one might
argue this nonetheless should not lead courts to set aside their long-standing holdings that
police wiretapping constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The argument would be that
unregulated police wiretapping would give precisely the kind of unrestrained power that is
incompatible with “freedom and privacy” required in “a free and open society.” We do not rule
out the possibility that such an argument might justify treating police and private actors
differently in some cases. But it would require, at a minimum, a convincing explanation of
why the damage that such police surveillance poses to “freedom and privacy” has not already
been inflicted by its private equivalent.
129. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
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mation about neighborhoods for commercial purposes, this does not
necessarily mean that citizens would be comfortable with police con-
ducting these same activities for purposes of law enforcement. But
even if such an argument seems normatively plausible, which might
be situation-specific, it is not one that has to our knowledge ever
persuaded the courts. Instead, for example, the Supreme Court’s
belief that private persons regularly trespass on private property led
it to permit law enforcement, as a Fourth Amendment matter, to do
the same.130 That case is actually rather startling, because the
behavior at issue was independently criminal, and therefore the
Court’s result is one with which we disagree.131 But it shows a very
strong judicial preference for permitting law enforcement to do
whatever private persons do. 
Thus, both legally and probably normatively, wide-scale use of
drones by private actors would make it harder to argue that police—
and only police—should have to overcome special hurdles to make
observations that others freely make. At the very least, the burden
should rest on those asserting such restriction, and such restriction
might not be appropriate as a Fourth Amendment standard, which
defines only the rights floor. And this seems true regardless of one’s
particular conception of Fourth Amendment search.
B. Third Party and Private Search Doctrines
As just described, a “public disclosure” doctrine that does not
require police alone to shield their eyes strikes us as generally
defensible: if I make information available to everyone, and in fact
unrelated persons do access that information, then I assume the
risk that the government too will access it. But the same intuitions
do not support the extreme form of this doctrine that the Court
developed from the 1960s through the 1980s, known as the third
party doctrine.
The third party doctrine provides that if one knowingly shares
information with a single third party, then she loses all reasonable
expectations of privacy in that information with respect to govern-
ment access to that information from that party, regardless of any
130. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
131. See id. at 190-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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promises of confidentiality the third party has made.132 Hence, as far
as the initial disclosing party is concerned, the government can
obtain that information from the third party without any Fourth
Amendment restraint—mere whim or caprice will suffice. According
to the Court’s foundational cases, one assumes the risk that the
third party is or will be working with the government.133 But of
course, this misunderstands privacy, which is all about differential
information sharing,134 and it begs the question, because the Court,
in articulating the legal rules, defines what risks we must assume
as a constitutional matter. Thus, the third party doctrine has engen-
dered withering criticism and, at least in one view, is already
showing signs of decay.135
If the doctrine remains, however, it is yet another manner in
which private information-gathering affects government access.
Imagine a person knowingly permits or provides drone footage to a
third party, perhaps a citizen contracting with a private security
company (imagine “ADT drones”) or a farmer or rancher contracting
with a company that monitors the condition of crops or cattle. If that
private security or monitoring company decides of its own initiative
and volition to provide certain information to law enforcement,136
the Fourth Amendment is simply not implicated by this purely
private conduct.137 Furthermore, under the third party doctrine, the
132. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376-79 (2006).
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
134. Cf. Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV.
227, 232-33 (2012) (explaining that information privacy is encapsulated by the right to control
dissemination of information).
135. See Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 434-55 (2013); see also United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (contending that “it may be necessary
to reconsider” the third party doctrine, which is “ill-suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties” for limited purposes
without expecting “warrantless disclosure to the Government”).
136. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS § 25-2.1(f)(ii) (2013) (using “initiative and volition” as the standard and
explaining the reason for its adoption).
137. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment’s “origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies”).
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citizen, farmer, or rancher has no Fourth Amendment claim even if
the government forcibly obtains the footage from the third-party
monitoring company, perhaps via an easy-to-obtain subpoena.138
If we further imagine the many situations in which drone footage
will likely be obtained without the permission of an individual
whose person, property, or activities are recorded, we see the private
search doctrine creates additional linkage between the First and
Fourth Amendments. Imagine a journalist or Google captures drone
video. That capture has no Fourth Amendment significance unless
the journalist or Google is acting as an agent of the government,
which will rarely be the case.139 If the journalist or Google independ-
ently decides to turn over certain footage, that too does not trigger
the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, even if positive law requires the
company to turn over certain content, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated so long as the company was not required to gather or
search that content, meaning the “finding” remained a purely pri-
vate act.140 Even if the government compels disclosure, via subpoena
138. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect
Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 199 (2014) (describing and criticizing
the almost nonexistent controls on grand jury subpoenas). 
139. Each federal circuit uses its own test to determine when a private person acts as an
agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes, but they are substantively similar.
For example, the Tenth Circuit utilizes “the following two-part inquiry”: “1) whether the
government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) whether the party
performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.”
United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876
F.2d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1989)). As an example of a company that would seem to trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, consider Vigilant Solutions, which creates and sells surveillance
technology to police. See VIGILANT SOLS., http://vigilantsolutions.com/ [http://perma.cc/ H3HH-
4DMD] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). The company gathers license plate images with vehicle-
mounted cameras and places that information in a database it freely makes available to
police, clearly desiring that it be used for law enforcement purposes. See Ali Winston, Plans
to Expand Scope of License-Plate Readers Alarm Privacy Advocates, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING (June 17, 2014), http://cironline.org/reports/plans-expand-scope-license-plate-
readers-alarm-privacy-advocates-6451 [http://perma.cc/7Y9H-UD2V]; National Vehicle
Location Service, VIGILANT SOLS., http://nvls-lpr.com/nvls/nvls_faq.html [http://perma. cc/
3HUP-ZRFG] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). Another candidate would be Persistent
Surveillance Systems. See Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone




140. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 90 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that mandatory disclosure laws are not Fourth Amendment
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or search warrant, the person whose interests are most at
stake—she whose person, land, or other interests are depicted—has
no Fourth Amendment claim.141
In sum, by affecting what types and amounts of records are
potentially available to police, private UAV flight alters the incen-
tives for police themselves to take to the skies and dampens the
effectiveness of any restriction on police flight. In this manner, law
enforcement access upon private initiative and according to the
third party doctrine, like that via the public disclosure doctrine,
depends upon private access, and thus depends, at least in part,
upon the First Amendment.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO RECORD AND GATHER
INFORMATION
In past years it would have seemed strange to treat the FAA’s
regulation of navigable airspace as raising a First Amendment
issue. This is not to say certain regulations might not have had First
Amendment impacts, as in August 2014 when the FAA created a no-
fly zone over protests regarding a police killing in Ferguson,
Missouri.142 For decades, though, the FAA has regulated where
planes, helicopters, and other aerial vehicles travel in America’s
airspace, and courts have not treated such regulation or restriction
of flight as a First Amendment activity.143 But as discussed below,
navigable airspace recently has become a prominent site of impor-
tant speech-related activity—from journalism to photography to
filmmaking—due to the increasing availability and use of relatively
inexpensive, camera-equipped UAVs.
When private UAV flights have occurred in the United States, the
FAA has quickly—and forcefully—reminded those engaged in such
activities that, apart from hobbyists, UAVs cannot be used in public
restricted); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 365-68 (4th Cir. 2010) (so holding for
federal statute requiring Internet service providers to report child pornography).
141. Cf. Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 138, at 214 (describing the reality of third-party
subpoenas).
142. See Letter from Anthony E. Rothert, Legal Dir., ACLU of Mo. Found., to Reggie
Govan, Chief Counsel, FAA (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.aclu-mo.org/files/6914/1512/3362/FAA_
Letter__11.4.14.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WJ7-U486] (addressing the no-fly zone and articulating
First Amendment concerns).
143. See infra Part IV.
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airspace without FAA permission.144 The FAA has thus far respond-
ed to each such use of drones on a case-by-case basis, but it has been
tasked by Congress, in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012, to formulate “a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national
airspace system.”145 Such a plan will inevitably affect how, where,
and in what circumstances journalists, photographers, filmmakers,
and others can conduct increasingly popular and important First
Amendment activity. It is thus essential for the FAA and others to
understand whether, in crafting the plan, they are constrained by
constitutional free speech protections.
This Part commences this analysis. It first examines conflicts over
UAV use that some media organizations, public interest groups, and
other observers have seen as raising First Amendment questions.
With these examples in hand, it then turns to whether regulations
that affect reporting or other speech activity do so in ways that
trigger First Amendment protection. After all, virtually any law or
regulation places some limits on the raw material that curious
would-be speakers or writers might obtain from the world. For
example, if the First Amendment does not forbid trespass and
wiretapping laws from keeping information-seekers out of other
people’s backyards, offices, and private communications, why would
it restrain Congress, the FAA, or state legislators when they seek to
bar reporters or other private drone operators from public airspace?
As explained below, the answer lies partly in the fact that certain
uses of UAVs for photography or videography likely constitute First
Amendment activity in a way that trespass and wiretapping do not.
It is also because—although government has and must have
considerable authority over public airspace—forum doctrine does
not give government the kind of untrammeled and exclusive control
over public airspace that private property owners have over their
own property, nor the power that individuals have to exclude others
from channels of private communications.
144. See supra Part I.
145. FMRA § 332(a).
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A. Recent FAA Limits on Drone Journalism and Videography
Among the many benefits that drones promise are a leap forward
in the kind of reporting possible for traditional journalists and for
bloggers. They allow reporters to capture extraordinary aerial
footage that would have been prohibitively expensive, if not impos-
sible, without UAV technology. A recent article in the Columbia
Journalism Review describes drones as “a game changer, with pow-
ers that could fundamentally transform a journalist’s ability to tell
stories.”146 In many cases, particularly outside the United States,
such technology has allowed reporters and others to circumvent
tight government controls on information, and often overcome other
barriers that would have prevented the public from learning about
important political developments. A 2014 article in the Economist
points out that it was from drone cameras that reporters “shot the
most revealing footage of the protests that toppled Viktor Yanu-
kovych, [Ukraine’s] corrupt president” and “offered a bird’s-eye view
of civil conflict in Thailand, Venezuela and elsewhere.”147
The United States, however, does not yet allow journalists to
make extensive use of drones for reporting. In fact, the FAA has
repeatedly responded to drone reporting by making it clear that,
except for very limited use by hobbyists, such drone use is not (yet)
permissible without an FAA exemption.148 Drone journalism pro-
grams at the University of Missouri and the University of Nebraska
received letters from the FAA demanding they cease using drones
until after receiving a Certificate of Authority from the FAA.149
These programs had used drones to gather video footage for stories
on brush fires, fracking along the Missouri River, bird migration,
146. Louise Roug, Eye in the Sky, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (May 1, 2014), http://www.cjr.
org/cover_story/eye_in_the_sky.php [http://perma.cc/QFZ7-H56S].
147. See Drone Journalism: Eyes in the Skies, ECONOMIST (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/news/international/21599800-drones-often-make-news-they-have-started-
gathering-it-too-eyes-skies [http://perma.cc/H2RG-5ABV].
148. See FAA Ban on Drone Journalism Challenged, MEDIA CONFIDENTIAL (May 7, 2014),
http://mediaconfidential.blogspot.com/2014/05/faa-ban-on-drone-journalism-chellenged.html
[http://perma.cc/5RHU-49SZ] (“The FAA won’t currently issue drone permits to news organ-
izations, and journalists who’ve used the small, unmanned aircraft have been fined.”).
149. See FAA Grounds Journalism School Drones at MU and Nebraska, KAN. CITY STAR
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article325896/FAA-grounds-journalism
-school-drones-at-MU-and-Nebraska.html [http://perma.cc/B44A-DUN4].
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and archaeological excavations.150 A storm chaser also received FAA
attention after using a drone to shoot video of areas in Arkansas hit
by a tornado.151
Such actions have triggered protests from journalists and videog-
raphers claiming that UAV restrictions may run afoul of the First
Amendment.152 Perhaps the most developed response came from a
case that was not about journalism but about the creation of a
promotional video. In 2011, a remote control plane hobbyist and
entrepreneur named Raphael Pirker used a drone to make a video
about the University of Virginia campus, and the FAA fined him
$10,000.153 The FAA’s decision focused not on First Amendment
questions but on its own regulations. Yet the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, the Washington Post, the New York Times,
and other newspaper and magazine publishers filed an amicus
brief.154 The news media organizations’ central complaint was that,
in regulating commercial use of UAV video capture, the FAA failed
to distinguish ordinary commercial use of drones from “the First
Amendment rights of journalists to gather [ ] news.”155
The FAA now appears to be changing course: the Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking it issued on February 15, 2015 would consider-
ably expand the freedom of those operating small drones, including
journalists, to use them for capturing images. In short, as noted
150. See id.; Scott Pham, Yes, the University of Missouri Is Still Pursuing Drones, MO.
DRONE JOURNALISM PROGRAM (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.missouridronejournalism.com/
[http://perma.cc/3S4M-JXSV].
151. Gregory S. McNeal, FAA “Looking into” Arkansas Tornado Drone Journalism, Raising
First Amendment Questions, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
gregory mcneal/2014/04/29/faa-looking-into-arkansas-tornado-drone-journalism-raising-first-
amendment-questions/ [http://perma.cc/G933-3JEP].
152. Professor Gregory McNeal, for example, argues that the FAA improperly disregarded
interests in press freedom when it penalized a reporter for shooting drone footage of an
Arkansas tornado’s aftermath: “There is little doubt,” he stressed, “that the footage ... pro-
vide[d] a benefit to the public and has clear First Amendment value.” Gregory S. McNeal, The
Arkansas Tornado Footage the FAA Doesn’t Want You to See, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/04/28/drone-journalist-captures-stunning-
video-of-arkansas-tornado-destruction/ [http://perma.cc/64DJ-XN2F].
153. See Pirker, NTSB No. CP-217, at 1, Attach. 1 (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.ntsb.gov/
legal/alj/Documents/Pirker-CP-217.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PVC-QSXA].
154. Brief for News Media as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Huerta v. Pirker (No.
CP-217), https://nppa.org/sites/default/files/Huerta%20v%20Pirker%20Amicus%2005-06-14.
pdf [http://perma.cc/QC2V-ZQQQ].
155. Id. at 10.
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earlier, a drone operator would be able to fly and capture video foot-
age with any drone under fifty-five pounds so long as she flew the
drone only in daytime and within her “visual line of sight,” and
avoided flying it near airports, in other restricted airspace, or over
“people not directly involved in the operation [of the drone].”156
The FAA’s proposed rules have been welcomed by journalists,157
but they do not avoid the need to understand the First Amendment
questions and difficulties raised by drone image capture. Notably,
even though the FAA’s proposed rules allow for drone journalism,
certain aspects of the proposed rules might still pose First Amend-
ment problems. The FAA’s visual line of sight requirement, for ex-
ample, might prevent journalists or other drone operators from
gathering information of public interest that can be obtained only
by a drone operating far from the operator’s location. Furthermore,
other government entities may impose additional restrictions on use
of drones to capture images. The Texas Privacy Act, for example,
makes it a crime to use “an unmanned aircraft to capture an image
of an individual or privately owned real property in this state with
the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual or property
captured in the image.”158 As some journalists have pointed out, the
law’s proscription on “surveillance” could bar information-gathering
conducted by investigative journalists.159 And as noted earlier,
Congress has likewise considered restricting drone image capture
to protect privacy.160
There thus remain unanswered First Amendment questions.
Moreover, if the First Amendment includes a right to observe or
record from the sky, such a right would protect far more than
professional journalism. Many photographers and videographers
may wish to gather aerial images for artistic expression, rather than
156. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg.
9544, 9546, 9547 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
157. See Al Tompkins, What the FAA’s Newly Proposed Drone Rules Mean to Journalists,
POYNTER (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/320079/what-the-faas-
newly-proposed-drone-rules-mean-to-journalists/ [http://perma.cc/J5JQ-LMYJ].
158. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 423.003 (2013).
159. See Matthew Schroyer, Journalists Are Vulnerable from Texas Anti-Drone Law, NPAA
Lawyer Says, PROF. SOC’Y OF DRONE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.dronejournal
ism.org/news/2013/9/journalists-are-vulnerable-from-texas-anti-drone-law-nppa-lawyer-says
[http://perma.cc/T57F-8JFT].
160. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 69-71.
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news reporting. Multiple websites, for example, feature collections
of drone videos created for their beauty rather than their news
value. The Smithsonian Magazine recently compiled “The Most
Beautiful Drone Travel Videos of 2014,” including footage taken
over “the high arctic,” beside an erupting volcano in Iceland, and in
Seattle and Beijing.161 A new website called “Travel By Drone”
allows users to select cities and other locations on a world map and
then virtually “visit” these sites by watching their scenes unfold in
vivid drone video footage.162 Likewise, YouTube has no shortage of
drone videos created by individuals or small studios, depicting topics
as varied as freight train movements163 and New Year’s Eve fire-
work displays.164 Drone images and videos have also been embraced
by real estate agents interested in providing home seekers with
views of houses and neighborhoods.165 Does anyone wishing to make
such an aerial video or photograph have a First Amendment right
to do so? Or are free speech rights protecting drone video cap-
ture—assuming they exist—narrow in scope, protecting only certain
kinds of image or video capture, certain speakers, or certain sub-
jects?
B. The First Amendment Right to Record—On the Ground and in
the Air
To understand whether the First Amendment applies to govern-
ment restrictions on aerial image and video capture, it is useful to
look first at the recently recognized “right to record” videos on the
ground. This First Amendment right is still quite undeveloped, and
its contours are therefore unclear. But in a series of recent cases on
161. See Natasha Geiling, The Most Beautiful Drone Travel Videos of 2014, SMITHSON-
IAN.COM (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/most-beautiful-drone-travel-
videos-2014-180953650/ [http://perma.cc/73RK-VWAN].
162. See TRAVELBYDRONE, http://travelbydrone.com [http://perma.cc/3QSU-TLF8] (last
visited Sept 7, 2015).
163. Delay in Block Prods., CSX Freight Train (Drone Video), YOUTUBE (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50VcZiREKBk [http://perma.cc/RN2N-P5GJ].
164. Team BlackSheep, Hong Kong Fireworks 2015-Filmed with a Drone, YOUTUBE (Dec.
31, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OX99sIC-MoQ [http://perma.cc/E37L-BAGK].
165. See Jim Harger, Real Estate Photographers Anxiously Await FAA Rules Before
Publishing Their Drone Shots, MLIVE (Sept. 3, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.mlive.com/
business/west-michigan/index.ssf/2014/09/real_estate_photographers_wait.html [http://perma.
cc/JE63-EADF].
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video recording of police encounters, federal courts have increas-
ingly recognized such a right. In 2000, the Eleventh Circuit in
Smith v. City of Cumming stated that “[t]he First Amendment
protects the right to gather information about what public officials
do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of
public interest,” and held that this includes a right to “photograph
or videotape police conduct.”166 In 2005, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Robinson v. Fetterman con-
cluded that “[t]he activities of the police, like those of other public
officials, are subject to public scrutiny” and, under the First Amend-
ment, are fair game for video recording.167 In 2011, the First Circuit
in Glik v. Cunniffe found the tradition of public access to trials168
also applies to “[t]he filming of government officials engaged in their
duties in a public place, including police officers performing their
responsibilities.”169 In 2012, the Seventh Circuit in American Civil
Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez held that citizens have a right
to make video and audio recordings of police actions.170
The Seventh Circuit in Alvarez went further than other courts
have in elaborating this right, but it still left many questions unan-
swered. The court found that because a videographer often does not
say or express any particular message while capturing video or
audio footage, her actions are essential to First Amendment speech
in two distinct ways. First, capture is an essential precondition to
later speech: “The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovi-
sual recording,” the court emphasized, “would be insecure, or largely
ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly
unprotected.”171 Just as one could not protect the artistic expression
in painting without providing some protection to the use of paint
and brushes, or in musical expression without protecting musical
instruments, one cannot protect video creation unless one protects
an individual’s right to use cameras and point them at the subject
of the film. For example, Raphael Pirker cannot screen or otherwise
166. 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
167. 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
168. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
169. 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
170. 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7-10 (1st Cir.
2014) (extending Glik protection to the recording of a traffic stop).
171. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595.
2015] REGULATING DRONES 87
share a video telling the world about the University of Virginia cam-
pus unless he can first capture video of it.
Second, the Seventh Circuit provided a reason particular to
recording of police encounters: it is essential that citizens in a func-
tioning democracy be able to record and share evidence concerning
police behavior (and misbehavior).172 As the Seventh Circuit noted,
for “the founding generation, the liberties of speech and press were
intimately connected with popular sovereignty and the right of the
people to see, examine, and be informed of their government.”173 The
court found a commitment to such purposes would be difficult to
square with a law that, by barring the recording of police actions,
“interfere[d] with the gathering and dissemination of information
about government officials performing their duties in public.”174
Armed with this precedent, courts might well conclude that if
citizens have a right to record police encounters or other events with
their smartphone cameras on the ground, they should likewise have
a right to do so from drone-mounted cameras in the sky. After all,
the court’s logic applies with equal force in both situations. Because
our indisputable First Amendment right to post and share videos
would be “insecure” unless the First Amendment also protects the
“antecedent act of making the recording,”175 it should not matter
whether we capture the video from the ground or the air. Imagine,
for example, that government officials know that the First Amend-
ment prevents them from censoring video of protests once a video
has been captured. They therefore resolve to exercise such censor-
ship indirectly by preventing reporters or other individuals from
creating such videos in the first place. The Seventh Circuit’s holding
is meant to rule out such an end-run around the First Amendment,
and there is no reason it should apply with any less force whether
the video that the government wishes to suppress is being shot from
the streets or from the air. In either case, video creation is protected
because it is an indispensable step in the process by which news
organizations, civic-minded individuals, or others document and
share with the broader public what happens in the nation’s public
life. Drone video capture is thus covered by the Seventh Circuit’s
172. See id. at 602-03.
173. Id. at 599.
174. Id. at 600.
175. Id. at 575.
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argument that free speech law must protect the process of producing
speech, and not simply the resulting speech itself.
Drone video capture is likewise covered by the other major pillar
of the Seventh Circuit’s argument. It is not only cell phone videos
that help give force to the “right of the people to see, examine, and
be informed of their government;”176 it is also bird’s eye images or
videos that reveal information invisible to those on the ground.
Individuals might learn important information or gain a valuable
perspective from aerial footage of a protest—or the police response
to it—that would be absent from the particular clips of such a
protest that people can capture from their specific location within it.
In fact, the right to record recognized by the Seventh Circuit ap-
pears to shield not only drone cameras used by investigative
reporters, but also those used by anyone else who might want to
capture video that they plan to post on YouTube or another website.
It is, after all, not primarily reporters, but rather conscientious
bystanders (or subjects of police investigation, themselves) who have
captured the cell phone videos protected by courts in cases like Glik,
or disseminated to the public in cases such as the police chokehold
leading to the death of Eric Garner177 or the police shooting leading
to the death of Walter Scott.178
If there is a right to record from the skies, then, it might seem
that the right is a very broad one. However, the state of First
Amendment law on this issue is very unsettled. As noted by Margot
Kaminski in one of the only articles to examine the implications of
a right to record for drone use, some courts have raised doubts about
the scope of the right.179 While not denying that individuals may
have a First Amendment right to video- or audiorecord some
matters of public interest, the Third and Fourth Circuits found that
176. Id. at 599.
177. See Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New
York Police, TIME (July 22, 2014), http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-chokehold-
death/ [http://perma.cc/S6RU-ZAB9] (noting that the video was shot with a cell phone camera
by Garner’s friend Ramsey Orta).
178. See Michael E. Miller et al., How a Cellphone Video Led to Murder Charges Against
a Cop in North Charleston, S.C., WASH. POST. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/08/how-a-cell-phone-video-led-to-murder-charges-against-a-
cop-in-north-charleston-s-c/ [http://perma.cc/JB8G-8QK6] (contrasting official police account
of shooting with bystander cell phone footage that captured it unbeknownst to police).
179. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry,
4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 61 (2013).
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such a right was not “clearly established” and that police therefore
had qualified immunity when they arrested individuals recording
police activities.180 The Third Circuit has also noted that while
individuals may have a right to record, some cases have indicated
that the recording must have some “expressive purpose” to warrant
First Amendment protection.181
A federal district court recently took note of these circuits’
doubts182—and added an additional one of its own—when a man
sued police after they barred him from recording an accident scene
from a drone. Even if there were a clearly established First Amend-
ment right to record police from the ground, said the court, this does
not mean that such a right would cover aerial recording as well.183
To be sure, these courts’ doubts about the right to record seem to
be the exception to the rule. More courts have found that individuals
have a right to record police encounters, and neither the Third nor
Fourth Circuit deny that such a right exists—even if it is not
sufficiently clear to provide a basis for suits against police. And in
refusing to extend such a right to drones, the District Court for the
District of Connecticut failed to explain why recording might lose
First Amendment protection when it occurs from an aerial vantage
point: as explained earlier, a videographer who documents and
shares footage of public interests furthers First Amendment inter-
ests in precisely the same way whether the footage comes from a
cell-phone camera or a drone-mounted camera.
Yet an unqualified right to create drone videos would be problem-
atic for at least two reasons. One is that a limitless right seems to
cut squarely against firmly established Supreme Court precedent.
Our right to speak, the Court said fifty years ago in Zemel v. Rusk,
“does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather informa-
180. See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
right to record police officers was not clearly established at time of arrest); Szymecki v. Houck,
353 Fed. App’x. 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009) (same).
181. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. If the Third Circuit’s suggestion here is that recording should
receive First Amendment protection only when the person creating it does so with the intent
to incorporate it into a subsequent communication, this argument is highly problematic for
the reasons we give in the text accompanying notes 202-205 infra.
182. See Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar.
23, 2015).
183. Id. at *10.
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tion.”184 Just because one wants to write or talk about a company’s
questionable practices, for example, does not mean that one has a
First Amendment right to trespass in order to gain access to its
facilities, or wiretap its phones to listen to its CEO’s private conver-
sations. Rather, the Supreme Court has emphasized that although
the right to free speech entails a corollary right to “receive informa-
tion and ideas,”185 this does not mean one can take measures to
extract information from any source where she might find it. The
First Amendment only gives us a right to receive information from
“a willing speaker.”186 Without this qualification, a right to receive
information might endanger numerous government regulations long
considered by courts to present no constitutional problem. Laws
forbidding wiretapping or other surreptitious recording of individu-
als, for example, certainly prevent us from collecting data and from
sharing it down the road. Without such limitation, persons equipped
with cameras would be able to argue for free-for-all information-
gathering rights; individuals would still be stopped by property laws
from flying their drones into spaces they had no right to access, but
under this conception, anywhere they had a right to be, they would
also have a right to record.
There is a second problem with a virtually unqualified right to
record. It would likely make it impossible for lawmakers and regula-
tors to address one of the key worries raised about the incredible
proliferation of cameras in the early twenty-first century: the po-
tentially devastating effect they have on citizens’ anonymity and
privacy. Indeed, as we noted earlier, unfettered law enforcement use
of UAVs has raised deep fears about the rise of an Orwellian
surveillance regime—and these fears extend to private use of UAVs
as well. Justice Sotomayor gave voice to widely shared concerns
when she recently said that people should be concerned about
private as well as government drone surveillance.187 But if citizens
were armed with a First Amendment right to record everything they
could from a lawful vantage point, inflicting such damage on privacy
184. 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
185. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
186. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
187. Jacob Gershman, Sotomayor: Americans Should Be Alarmed by Spread of Drones, 
WALL ST. J: L. BLOG. (Sept. 12, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/09/12/justice-
sotomayor-americans-should-be-alarmed-by-spread-of-drones [http://perma.cc/U28 D-WDRA].
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would not only become a possibility, it would be a constitutional
right. Consequently, the right to record recognized by the Seventh
Circuit in Alvarez (and other federal and state courts before that)
cannot be a right to record everything from everywhere.
How, then, might courts place principled limits on such a right to
record while still acknowledging and giving force to the crucial First
Amendment role that drone journalism and other drone image or
video capture can play in both democratic deliberation and artistic
expression? The remainder of Part II considers four options. For rea-
sons made clear below, none of these options is satisfactory as a
stand-alone limit on drone capture. Each of them, however, provides
components that might be part of a sufficiently nuanced First
Amendment framework for drone regulation. More specifically,
courts will likely adhere to Zemel ’s holding that surveillance or
other information-gathering, taken alone, lacks First Amendment
protection unless it has a substantial nexus to speech or other
expression. In short, it might matter (1) what type of recording it is
(photography or nonphotographic image capture), (2) who is doing
the recording (journalists or someone outside the press), (3) what
the recording is about (government activity or some other events
that are “matters of public concern,” as opposed to matters of purely
private interest), and (4) whether the government’s drone restriction
has the purpose of thwarting speech (or perhaps keeping individuals
in ignorance of public affairs or other matters of public concern).
Each of these factors might place (or toughen) a First Amendment
shield in front of drone surveillance that would otherwise be left
vulnerable to government restriction: In the hands of photographers
or filmmakers, drone image capture might become artistic expres-
sion; in the hands of journalists, or others commenting on public
affairs, it might become a part of public discourse. Even when drone
surveillance seems disconnected from such artistic or political ex-
pression, First Amendment values may be offended when govern-
ment bars drone image capture in order to silence the speech that
capture makes possible.
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1. The Type of Recording: Photography Versus
Nonphotographic Image Capture
For many, drone cameras immediately conjure up images—and
fears—of surveillance. But drone cameras are also tools of artistic
expression. Photographers and filmmakers have used them to cap-
ture aerial images and film footage. A National Geographic photo-
grapher and cinematographer, for example, used cameras mounted
on drones and ground-based robotic vehicles to capture images of
lions in Tanzania.188 Likewise, an amateur photographer using
drone cameras in Philadelphia captured striking images of his
hometown from otherwise inaccessible vantage points.189 Makers of
surfing videos have explored using drones to film their sport “from
a perspective that was unimaginable just a few years ago.”190 And
Hollywood studios have also taken note of drones’ potential as a
movie-making tool: they successfully petitioned the FAA for an
exemption from its drone restriction so that they can capture aerial
footage for commercial films.191
However, not all drone image or video capture would likely
count—in observers’ minds—as “photography,” “videography,” or
“filmmaking.” When a company captures video with a surveillance
camera on its property, or police do so from cameras mounted over
city streets, people do not typically think of them as engaged in the
art of videography or filmmaking. They are capturing images, but
they are doing so not to express themselves or to create a work of
aesthetic value. Rather, they obtain such images solely for the infor-
mational content found in them. In many cases, no one is making
any choices, let alone artistic choices, about what images to capture.
188. Amar Toor, National Geographic Uses Drones and Robots to Capture Stunning Images
of African Lions, VERGE (Aug. 9, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/8/9/4604
876/national-geographic-living-with-lions-serengeti-robot-drone-photography [http://perma.cc/
5FFT-W39D].
189. Emma Jacobs, The High Art of Drone Photography, CITYLAB (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.citylab.com/tech/2014/09/the-high-art-of-drone-photography/380889/ [http://perma.cc/
8YBF-7NZM]; see also PHILLY BY AIR, http://www.phillybyair.com [http://perma.cc/VDP6-
B5SZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
190. Jeff Mull, The Rise of the Drone, SURFER (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.surfermag.com/
features/drones/#IktMVAFZ5zhdAOUr.97 [http://perma.cc/3UK6-BP2P].
191. Alan Levin, Hollywood Drone Waivers Set Stage for More FAA Approvals, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 25, 2014, 5:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-25/hollywood-drone-
waivers-set-stage-for-more-faa-approvals.html [http://perma.cc/78T5-JRDS].
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The video capture is often automated. It is this kind of video
creation—video creating simply to find out about events the video
depicts—that is typically occurring when police or others use UAV
cameras or other cameras to carry out surveillance.
This distinction—between image or video capture that is integral
to artistic expression and video capture that is simply a tool of
surveillance—may be important in thinking about the contours of
a First Amendment right to record. Long before federal courts began
to recognize any such recording right, the Supreme Court stressed
in the 1973 case of Kaplan v. California that “[p]ictures [and]
films ... have First Amendment protection.”192 The Court likewise
assumed that right to be clear in the 1984 case of Regan v. Time,
Inc., when it held Time Magazine had a right to print photographs
of U.S. currency on its cover despite laws limiting use of such photos
to certain noncommercial purposes.193
One could perhaps argue that First Amendment protection for
image or video capture should be limited to those images and videos
that count as photographic or other artistic expression. Under this
view, when drone cameras capture images or video footage for use
in a nature documentary, a travel video, or even a personal photo
album or YouTube video, they would receive First Amendment pro-
tection. Such protection would be absent, by contrast, when drones
instead function as tools to spy upon or otherwise surveil a person
or place, rather than express or communicate the views or feelings
of the person recording. After all, the language of the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause singles out “speech” or other expression
for such protection.194 Its language, one might urge, does not protect
information-gathering that occurs in the absence of speech and
independent of any communicative process or expressive endeavor.
For example, the Free Speech Clause probably does not give
scientists a right to take and test soil samples from a park in order
to test them for chemical contamination, or a right to gather
“abandoned DNA” from their fellow citizens to learn more about
192. 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973). The Court added that pictures and films may lose First
Amendment protection when they are “obscene,” since “obscenity is not protected by the
Constitution.” Id.
193. 468 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1984); see also Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 336 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014) (holding that “photograph and visual recordings are inherently expressive”).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
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their biological content. If these methods of gleaning information
from our surroundings do not count as “speech,” then neither (one
might claim) should use of technologies—like drone-mounted cam-
eras or microphones—that capture light and sound waves to see
what they tell us about the world. Indeed, legal bans on wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping arguably depend on precisely such an
assumption.
Consider, for example, a law that makes it illegal to place, and
record from, a hidden microphone near a bench in a public park or
a public plaza.195 Allowing such surreptitious sound capture seems
incompatible with a society that leaves sufficient room for private
conversation. Even in public spaces, people do not expect that their
sometimes-sensitive discussions with friends and family members
will be available for anyone who wants to record them. Courts have
not classified such surreptitious audio recording as First Amend-
ment activity (even if publishing or disseminating it might count as
such), and perhaps the same rule should apply to video surveillance.
In other words, image capture would count as First Amendment ac-
tivity only when it is part of photography or some other conventional
means of artistic or other expression, but not when it is simply a
means of gathering information.
It is possible to highlight significant differences between the two
ends of a spectrum that runs from (1) the photography or videogra-
phy of a serious artist to (2) the automated image recording carried
out by a business surveillance camera or other machine. When indi-
viduals use photography to express themselves, by telling a story
from a certain perspective, or conveying thoughts and feelings, they
will likely make careful choices about the visual result they wish to
create. Ansel Adams, for example, spoke about visualizing what an
image in nature would look like before taking the picture.196 In other
words, professional photographers or videographers might think
about the message they wish to express and the audience response
they hope to generate in some of the same ways that painters or
195. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(2), 2511(1) (2012) (protecting against interception of “oral
communications,” defined to require a justified expectation against interception). 
196. See Milton Esterow, Ansel Adams: The Last Interview, ART NEWS (1984), http://mary
ellenmark.com/text/magazines/art%20news/905N-000-001.html [http://perma.cc/3H52-U9FW]
(“You come across a phenomenon in nature that you can visualize as an image. Then, if you
have the craft, you proceed to make it.”).
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illustrators do. They will think about how to frame the objects in
their picture, or how the lighting will affect its appearance. By
contrast, an automated surveillance camera simply captures a
visual record of whatever is in its field of view. It has no feelings or
beliefs to express, and in the typical case, the persons or entities
that set up such a camera and retrieve video from it do not do so to
express themselves or to tell a story from a particular vantage point.
They are using cameras in much the same way that some people use
GPS devices to track a person or a car: to automatically record data
(visual data in the case of camera, location data in the case of GPS
tracking) that will inform them about facts in the world, such as
whether a depicted person seems to be carrying a bag of drugs or
whether a car is shown by a GPS record to have parked near the
residence of a known drug dealer.197
This stance, however, is too simple. First, despite the extremes
articulated above, it is far from easy for courts or others to draw a
workable dividing line between photography or other expressive
image capture, on the one hand, and surveillance or informational
image capture that is “nonspeech” for First Amendment purposes,
on the other. Most image capture that people engage in with drone
cameras, or smartphones for that matter, falls between the two
extremes. Even people snapping a quick photo with a smartphone
typically make some choices about the framing or lighting of a
particular shot. So too do individuals who fly cameras above their
neighborhood to see what it looks like from such a vantage point.
Any lack of deep attention to artistry or craft does not, taken alone,
have any consequence for First Amendment protection. The Court
long ago stressed that constitutional protection for artistic activity
cannot depend on any judicial (or other) assessment of artistic quali-
ty or merit.198
197. For a more complete discussion of differences between photography and automated
image capture, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped):
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Google
Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 131-41 (2012).
198. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (stating that “[t]hough we can
see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines [“made up of criminal news
or stories of deeds of bloodshed, or lust”], they are as much entitled to the protection of free
speech as the best of literature”). Indeed, the Court has recently stressed that a violent video
game such as Mortal Kombat is entitled to as much First Amendment protection as an epic
poem such as Dante’s Divine Comedy. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
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Thus, it seems problematic to insist, as some lower courts have,
that photography conducted for “recreational and aesthetic”
purposes lacks the First Amendment protection that would almost
certainly prevent government from censoring a professional
photographer, filmmaker, or photojournalist.199 The courts that have
reached such a conclusion did so on the ground that purely recre-
ational photography is not inherently expressive, and thus only
counts as “speech” when there is additional evidence that the
picture-taker has a communicative purpose. In Porat v. Lincoln
Towers Community Association, a federal district court found that
the First Amendment did not protect digital pictures taken of a
building complex by a “photo hobbyist” because the photographer
could not demonstrate he had an “intent to communicate a message
to an audience.”200 In Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police Department,
another federal district court likewise found that a father trying to
videotape his daughter’s choir performance at a public school was
not engaged in First Amendment speech because he was videotap-
ing not to communicate about the performance but rather only for
“personal archival purposes, that is, ‘for family documentation of
[his daughter’s] childhood.’”201 This logic has two serious flaws. One
is that even “recreational” or “personal” photo-taking typically
results in some sharing of images: dedicated photo hobbyists rarely
keep their work entirely from view. They post photos they capture
on websites such as Shutterfly or Picasa, or, at the very least, show
them to friends and colleagues. Parents who document their
children’s activities likewise typically do so intending to share their
videos or photos with their children and other family members.
Though they might not share close to all of the photos they take,
this does not distinguish them from photojournalists who might
take tens or hundreds of photos intending to use only one of them.
Moreover, even when an individual takes photographs or videos
only for his own benefit, this does not make his photography or
videography any less expressive than the written expression in a
2737 n.4 (2011).
199. See, e.g., Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 3199(LAP), 2005 WL
646093, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005). 
200. Id.
201. Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police Dep’t, 825 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
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private journal (which would likely be staunchly protected by the
First Amendment against government restriction or punishment).202
A second difficulty in distinguishing protected photography from
unprotected surveillance is that if that distinction cannot be based
on attention to artistic detail, then there are similar problems in
basing it upon the capturing person’s goals or objectives. Photogra-
phy is often as much about seeing and learning about aspects of the
world that were previously invisible as it is about giving expression
to a message, feeling, or story. Indeed, for some of this seeing and
learning about new things, people may not only take many photos
or videos with drones, smartphones, and wearable cameras (such as
the GoPro cameras one can wear on a helmet or mount on bicycle
handlebars)—they may use automated image capture, perhaps
having a wearable camera continuously film the action unfolding in
front of them.203 Such automated image capture seems very similar
to image capture taken from a street lamp or an overhead drone.
Where then, precisely, would courts draw the line between photo-
graphic activity that is entitled to First Amendment protection and
nonphotographic activity that is not?
In his detailed argument for giving all such image capture First
Amendment protection, Seth Kreimer argues that any such line is
constitutionally irrelevant. To Kreimer, even “ambient image cap-
ture”—not only “premeditated image capture”—should count as part
of the conventional photographic activity firmly protected by the
Free Speech Clause.204 This argument has power, but seems to cut
against the strong intuition that use of video for surveillance has
less in common with photography than with nonspeech information
gathering, such as electronic eavesdropping or location tracking.
202. Consider, for example, the famous journals of Emily Dickinson and Anne Frank. 
203. See, e.g., Nick Paumgarten, We Are a Camera: Experience and Memory in the Age of
GoPro, NEW YORKER (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/22/camera
[http://perma.cc/N8JB-KRKA] (describing both situations in which individuals exercise some
minimal control over the image capture by tilting their heads, but also other situations in
which individuals simply engage in “life logging” all events unfolding in front of them).
204. See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 347-51, 372 (2011) (arguing that
the First Amendment protects “courses of action that are recognized by social practice as
comprising media of expression” and that image capture generally constitutes such a social
practice).
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As if that were not trouble enough, there is a second problem with
First Amendment jurisprudence that limits constitutional protection
for drone- or other image-based capture to capture that has some
artistic or expressive quality: the First Amendment value of images
often lies elsewhere. Consider again Alvarez and other cases that
have constitutionally shielded individuals who use their cell phones
to record police.205 What courts stress about these cell phone videos
in protecting them is not that they are artistically created, or other-
wise expressive of the recorders’ distinctive views, feelings, or
perspectives. What matters most for courts is that (1) the recorder
was creating a video to generate and share a visual record of certain
events, and (2) these events have public significance. On this ac-
count, the visual information that a camera captures about the
police encounter itself has First Amendment value—and does so
whether or not the camera-operator intended to engage in artistic
expression. In fact, even footage of a police officer taken by an
automated camera mounted on someone’s dashboard, or a surveil-
lance camera in someone’s yard, seems to qualify for the right to
record protection extended by Alvarez.
This is in part because, as Jane Bambauer has argued, capturing
and sharing video in order to communicate the facts it records (for
example, that a police officer hit a person) is functionally similar to
recording and sharing the same information with notes, or in some
other way.206 Because courts would almost certainly extend First
Amendment protection to a journalist’s taking and sharing of notes,
or a person’s recounting of an event fixed in his memory, why not
also extend protection to a person who records the same event with
a camera? Could the First Amendment really prefer the less accu-
rate recollection? In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme
Court rejected a restriction on recording by undercover agents on
much of these grounds.207 Thus, there is a problem with trying to
delineate, and rely heavily upon, a constitutionally significant line
between photography and other forms of image capture.208
205. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012).
206. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014).
207. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (equating an undercover agent
or informant listening to one recording and/or transmitting). 
208. It is worth noting that such a line currently has little significance in the FAA’s
regulation of UAV surveillance, which instead emphasizes the distinction between commercial
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But even if a distinction between photographic and nonphoto-
graphic image capture cannot provide the key to what does and does
not count as First Amendment speech, it may still have First
Amendment importance. As noted before, human beings engage in
countless activities to collect and learn from evidence about the
world. They do so not merely by using cameras to capture light, but
also by collecting and applying forensic science to physical evidence.
Not all of this can conceivably count as First Amendment “speech,”
even if it ultimately sheds light on matters of public importance. So
the Constitution leaves the government largely free to regulate such
information-gathering (subject only to rational basis review), as long
as it avoids doing so in a way that is aimed at suppressing speech
or preventing audiences from hearing the message (or learning the
facts) such speech conveys. For example, surreptitious audio
recording may not count as “speech” or other First Amendment
activity. But if Congress passes a law restricting such recording only
when it targets government officials, and only to prevent the public
from gaining a more accurate picture of its government, the
restriction may nonetheless raise First Amendment alarm bells.
When, on the other hand, the government restricts such audio
recording in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner, that restric-
tion would not trigger the First Amendment at all. A similar prin-
ciple might govern most drone image capture.
When drone image capture is more than simple image capture,
though—when it is photography, videography, or other artistic ex-
pression—even some evenhanded and neutral regulation may run
afoul of free speech law. The government may not evenhandedly bar
the distribution of pamphlets on streets, even to serve legitimate
and noncommercial activity. Under the current FAA regulations described in Part I,
recreational photographers and videographers are free to capture aerial images as long as
they fly their drones (safely) within visual line of sight and away from airports and air traffic.
This freedom to film is not limited to those who express themselves artistically. It disappears
only when the image capture becomes “commercial” in nature—and does so even when the
commercial picture-taker is also a photographer, filmmaker, or other artist. In the words of
one FAA spokesman, individuals may capture drone video solely for “personal use,” but “if the
same person flies the same aircraft and then tries to sell the video, or uses it to promote a
business, or accepts payments from someone else to shoot the video, that would be a
prohibited commercial operation” and would be allowed only after specific FAA approval.
Peter Corbett, Federal Ban on Drones Doesn’t Stop Photography, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 21,
2014), http: //www.azcentral .com/news /politics /articles /20140114federal-ban-drones-
photography.html [http://perma.cc/3VR7-6GXM]. 
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government ends such as preventing litter.209 A similar evenhanded,
content-neutral bar on photography or videography thus may be
unconstitutional. In other words, when image capture occurs as a
form of artistic expression, restriction of it might censor or damage
speech, even if causing such damage is not the government’s aim.
And First Amendment protection for photography and filmmaking
is so firmly established that the government certainly runs up
against it even when targeting only commercial filmmaking and
photography.210 After all, free speech law does not permit the gov-
ernment to confine writers only to recreational writing by banning
its commercial exercise unless they receive a license.211 Similarly,
the government may not prevent photographers and filmmakers
from making their art the basis of professional, or profit-seeking, ac-
tivity.212 It is thus unlikely that the FAA may, long-term, consti-
tutionally deny photographers or filmmakers the right to take aerial
pictures as soon as they do so as part of “a commercial operation,”
even if commercial activity may constitutionally be subjected to
heavier restriction.213
2. Who Is Recording: Journalists or Others
A second candidate for limiting the right to record is a principle
that vigorously protects drone journalism but not drone surveillance
or spying. If there is a First Amendment right to record from the
skies, perhaps it belongs not to everyone but only to reporters. In
other words, the right might not be a component of the First
Amendment’s “freedom of speech” guarantee, but rather of the
liberty it guarantees for “the press.”214
This proposed limit might solve the conundrum encountered
above, when it seemingly became impossible to protect necessary
drone image capture (including a civilian capturing police brutality
without artistic concern) without thereby constitutionally entrench-
209. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (holding unconstitutional an
ordinance preventing distribution of pamphlets on city streets without a permit).
210. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
213. As for whether a commercial distinction might be permissible as a temporary step in
drone integration into the national airspace, see infra Part IV.C.3.
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ing all surveillance.215 A narrower press-based right to record from
the air might answer this concern. This solution would provide some
guarantee that civilian drones can capture information that is
crucial for public deliberation, and that government would not have
a monopoly over such information.
Consider the airspace above a large political protest or march.
Given the safety hazards raised by the possibility of a UAV collision
with a person or vehicle, the FAA has been reluctant to permit
civilian drone use in a populated area.216 The site of massive social
or political protests, such as parts of Ferguson, Missouri in August
2014, might well raise such safety concerns. On the other hand, the
public may worry about a situation in which the only aerial footage
of such an event is created and controlled by the government. Inde-
pendent evidence would be valuable in case disputes arise over the
size of the protests, whether protestors were peaceful or violent, or
whether police response was fair and restrained. Thus, even if it is
unsafe to allow any and all citizens to fly UAVs over such an area,
perhaps it is essential that there be at least some eyes in the sky not
covered by government blinders.
The press is well-suited to play this role. First, as the Supreme
Court has written, journalists often “act[ ] as the ‘eyes and ears’ of
the public.”217 Journalists, in Justice Powell’s view, often act as
agents of citizens, obtaining information on current affairs that
citizens cannot obtain for themselves.218 Second, the First Amend-
ment’s reference to “freedom of ... the press”219 might indicate that
the Framers saw newspaper and pamphlet writers as exercising a
freedom different from, and perhaps in some respect broader than,
the “freedom of speech.” The Supreme Court has thus far refused to
adopt such a dual First Amendment jurisprudence, though, which
would provide different rights for reporters than for other civil-
ians.220 But some scholars have argued that, at least when it comes
215. See supra Part III.B.1.
216. FAA, Brief History, supra note 5.
217. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978). 
218. See id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
863-64 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
219. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
220. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83, 709 (1972); see also Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” (internal
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to information-gathering crucial to democratic deliberation, we may
need to recognize a press-based right to investigate the world, or
there will be no such constitutional right at all.
For example, Professor Barry McDonald first argues—echoing the
Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk—that the First Amendment cannot
provide all citizens the right to gather information in any way they
please.221 Such a broad information right would crowd out privacy
protection and many other “countervailing legally recognized inter-
ests.”222 Thus, says McDonald, in a clash between a right to know
and a right to privacy, the First Amendment should allow the right
to gather information to prevail only where the information
gathering is particularly important for speech that educates Ameri-
cans about public affairs.223 This, in McDonald’s opinion, is precisely
the information-gathering that journalists are committed to do:
their mission is not to gain and share information to advance their
private commercial interests, or target and embarrass enemies, or
inflict other harms that often flow from invasions of privacy.224
Instead, their aim is to find, and then to share with the public,
information that is of public concern.225 Moreover, as Paul Horwitz
has pointed out, the press has a better claim than most others to be
trusted with this information-gathering power.226 They are governed
by long-standing professional norms meant to ensure that their
reporting is fair and accurate.227 Whereas other individuals or
entities who fly drone cameras may feel no qualms about capturing
and divulging embarrassing footage of those they dislike or are
curious about, reporters are professionally committed to collect in-
formation—not as a means to satisfy their own curiosity, or for their
own benefit, but as agents of the public.228 As Sonja West writes, the
press has “distinct qualities” that make it uniquely suited to serve
quotations omitted)).
221. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards
a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 266
(2004).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 344-46.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 353-54.
226. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 167-71 (2013).
227. Id. at 169-70.
228. Id. at 169-71.
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the role of disseminating information to the public and of serving as
a “check on the government” and powerful private actors.229
Perhaps, then, if there is a right to record from the air, it is a
right of the press and not of the general public. But there are
significant problems with protecting only journalistic image capture.
One is that a press-based right to record raises the thorny
question—already confronting courts and legal scholars—of which
citizens who are recording video of public events should count as
“press.”230 Modern journalism includes not only reporters for news-
papers and television stations but also a dizzying array of smaller
players: bloggers, individuals who publish webpages with news and
commentary, and individuals who add information to news reports
in comment sections.231 All of these news sources may make valu-
able contributions to public discourse—and some of them may
capture and report on drone footage that newspapers do not have,
or do not view as sufficiently newsworthy.232 But it is not clear if any
or all of them should be able to invoke the freedom of press. Defined
so broadly, a press-based right to record would raise many of the
same problems as an unlimited right to record, leaving any blog or
website contributor with a right to capture video footage of anything
they could target from public space, including sensitive activities
such as when people enter a doctor’s office, quietly explore a new job
opportunity, purchase a book, or talk with family.233 And, as Profes-
sor Horwitz points out, these new media journalists may not be as
universally committed to the long-standing journalistic norms that
allegedly ensure fairness and accuracy in the established press.234
In short, perhaps there is good reason the Supreme Court has
refused to read the Press Clause more expansively than the Free
Speech Clause, but then we are once again without a limiting princi-
ple for the right to record.
229. Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2443-44 (2014).
230. HORWITZ, supra note 226,  at 167-72.
231. Id. at 167-68.
232. Id. at 167-70.
233. See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1048-49, 1056,
1064 (2011) (arguing that “courts must give the term ‘press’ a meaningfully narrow definition”
and that this may entail excluding some forms of new media).
234. See HORWITZ, supra note 226, at 169-71.
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3. The Subject of the Recording: Public Versus Private Matters
Perhaps, then, a First Amendment limit on drone video capture
should focus not on who is doing the recording, but rather on what
kind of activity is recorded. Perhaps a right to record should be
available to anyone—whether she is a journalist or someone else—
so long as she is recording footage of something that is newsworthy.
In other words, when drones capture important social events—foot-
age of a police officer using excessive force, a social protest, or a
company plant polluting a lake—such footage would be protected by
the First Amendment no matter who records it. By contrast, when
drone surveillance is used to capture sensitive and mundane details
of individuals’ day-to-day activities, such drone surveillance would
fall outside the First Amendment’s shield.
In certain areas of First Amendment law, courts already accord
greater protection to speech on “matters of public concern.” For
instance, individuals or media organizers accused of defamation or
intentional infliction of emotional distress receive much stronger
First Amendment protection when their speech is on a “matter of
public concern.”235 Government employees receive First Amendment
protection from employer-imposed speech restriction only when that
restriction targets speech on “matters of public concern.”236 As the
Court noted in Snyder v. Phelps, “speech on public issues occupies
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection,” and thus “where matters of purely
private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are
often less rigorous.”237
Moreover, as noted earlier, one of the Seventh Circuit’s key
reasons for recognizing a right to record police officers in Alvarez
was that such footage was important for democratic deliberation.238
Alvarez harkened back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia, which gave citizens a First Amend-
ment right to attend and observe criminal trials because all of the
235. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-58 (1985) (discussing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974)).
236. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
237. 562 U.S. at 452 (internal citations omitted).
238. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012).
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“expressly guaranteed freedoms” of speech, press, assembly, and
petition “share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of com-
munication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”239
Like with a right to drone journalism that is confined to reporters,
though, a right to record matters of public concern would likely be
either (1) far too broad to provide any meaningful limits or (2) far
too limiting to sufficiently protect crucial information-gathering by
UAVs and the speech thereby made possible.
On the one hand, the Court’s key test for what counts as “a
matter of public concern” seems potentially applicable to just about
any activity. The Court has noted that “the boundaries of the public
concern test are not well defined,” but might encompass “any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or—in an
alternative formulation—any matter that “is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.”240 The Court treats this test as a workable
guideline, but it raises numerous questions that so far have no
authoritative judicial answer.241 How large a portion of the commu-
nity must have an interest or potential interest in the subject? The
fate of a local park’s hiking trail, for example, might be of intense
interest to only the few individuals in a neighborhood who make
regular use of it. The fate of an old building with historical signifi-
cance might interest only a small group of conservationists. Would
drone footage illustrating the threats posed to such a hiking trail or
building by new development count as involving a “matter of public
interest?” Moreover, does the interest in the subject of someone’s
speech (or drone recording) have to exist at the time that speech or
239. 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
240. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452-53 (internal citations omitted).
241. Commentators have noted the vagueness and unpredictability of “the public concern”
test. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging
First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 44 (1990) (noting that “the prospect of
reducing that concept to a legal test yielding predictable results” is “remote”); Chris
Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public University Professor, 27 J.C. & U.L. 669,
669 (2001) (noting that there are “many cases where different courts (and different Justices)
view the same set of facts, and come to opposite conclusions on whether the expression at
issue pertained to a matter of public concern”); McDonald, supra note 221, at 346 (describing
the standards for identifying matters of public concern as “fairly amorphous”); Mark Strasser,
What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO. L. REV. 1083,
1119 (2012) (“[The] most disappointing [aspect] in this area has been the Court’s unwill-
ingness to offer helpful criteria in identifying what counts as a matter of public concern.”).
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recording takes place? Some issues might generate little interest
from the community at one time but take on much greater impor-
tance later on—after someone presents the footage and comments
on a previously ignored feature of it.
These questions are not merely academic. For example, they have
significant implications for whether the numerous drone travel
videos posted on websites would receive free speech protection that
covers only “matters of public concern.” Without a clearer test than
courts have articulated to date, it is far from certain whether drone
footage of Cadillac Ranch in Amarillo, Texas,242 or the Christmas
light displays in downtown Naperville, Illinois,243 would qualify.
Thus, it might be easier for courts—instead of reserving First
Amendment protection only for the ill-defined category of “matters
of public concern”—to extend protection to all topics except matters
of “private concern,” namely those details of an individual’s life that
she has a right to expect will remain shielded from public observa-
tion.244
An alternative solution to this problem is to define “matters of
public concern” to encompass only recording that is aimed at, or in
significant part about, government activities. The problem with
such a stance is that it would exclude from First Amendment protec-
tion drone footage (and other video) that is immensely valuable for
other reasons. For example, consider footage that has revealed envi-
ronmental contamination by company plants. The focus here is not
government activity. Nor is government the subject of many other
drone videos posted on YouTube and elsewhere that have appeared
to generate at least as much interest as videos of political subjects.
Just as maps generated by Google Earth’s planes and car-mounted
cameras may be of most intense interest to people who use them to
address individual problems or seek to enlighten themselves on
242. See FlyBy Films, Cadillac Ranch from a New Perspective—Amarillo Texas, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IosjAjtmIrs [http://perma.cc/Y9H8-MHQQ].
243. Andrew Meyer, Illinois Police Chief Seeks Criminal Charges Against Man Flying
Drone over City, PINAC: BE THE MEDIA (Jan. 9, 2015), http://photographyisnotacrime.com/
2015/01/illinois-police-chief-seeks-criminal-charges-man-flying-drone-city/ [http://perma.cc/
N8FL-RTEY].
244. Such an approach might build on Professor Ashutosh Bhagwhat’s argument for
treating a person’s or company’s speech as unprotected in circumstances where it entails
invasion of others’ privacy. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing,
and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 874-79 (2012).
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matters of individual curiosity, so too may those who seek beautiful
drone footage of an obscure cultural landmark, for example, derive
more value from that than from drone video that serves as political
commentary or education.
Perhaps the First Amendment can provide greater protection for
videos that help citizens learn about the activities of their govern-
ment. For example, drone videographers might be able to insist on
more leeway to fly and record, even when doing so raises some
safety concerns, if they can show that it is the only way to obtain
crucial records of government activity. This does not mean that all
other drone cameras should or could be left with no First Amend-
ment protection, though, so once again we have at best an incom-
plete limiting principle for the right to record.
4. The Purpose of Regulation
This Article has so far assumed that drone image capture might
gain the status of First Amendment expression only because of some
characteristic of the image capture itself: its artistic nature, its
journalist authorship, or its public concern. But it is also possible
that such a camera’s link to speech might be forged not by those
using drones, but by the government officials who are restricting
them. When government aims its restrictive power at drones not
simply to rid the skies of danger, but to cut off a certain kind of
speech at its source, that kind of indirect censorship might raise
First Amendment concerns even if the drone surveillance it restricts
would not otherwise count as First Amendment activity.
The most important precedent for this point is the Supreme
Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.245 In Sorrell, the
Court struck down Vermont’s restrictions on a form of drug market-
ing called “detailing.” Drug companies would send representatives
to the offices of individual doctors to give them a carefully prepared
marketing talk.246 Because Vermont believed that this aggressive
marketing was distorting doctors’ prescribing decisions by leading
them to prescribe more expensive brand-name drugs when generic
drugs would work just as well, Vermont sought to blunt the effect of
245. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658 (2011).
246. Id. at 2659.
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this marketing. The state barred detailers or others from obtaining
and using prescriber information to craft marketing proposals.247
The First Circuit found a similar measure by New Hampshire
constitutionally unproblematic because the sale of prescription drug
data was simply not the kind of commercial activity that counts as
First Amendment speech.248 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
that logic in Sorrell: even assuming that prescriber information is
not itself speech, speakers (drug companies) sought this information
to inform a certain kind of speech (their marketing).249 Vermont was
aiming its regulatory power at the transfer of such prescriber infor-
mation specifically to blunt the effect of drug companies’ speech,
which, said the Court, the First Amendment forbade. Vermont, in
short, was restricting an information transfer only to certain
“disfavored speakers,” those who wished to engage in drug market-
ing, and it was doing so in order to burden their speech.250
Under this holding, the First Amendment would similarly bar
drone restrictions aimed at burdening speech, even if they did so
indirectly by targeting the nonspeech activity that occurs when an
automated drone camera sweeps up information. If Congress or the
FAA made sure certain drone footage was never created because
they wanted to ensure that its contents did not enter public
discourse, this attempt at censorship would run afoul of the First
Amendment—and it would do so even if officials targeted the visual
data upon which a speaker relied, rather than targeting his speech
directly. In other words, this principle forbids censorious restriction
of drone image capture even when that capture itself has nothing to
do with photography, journalism, or speech on topics of public
concern.251
247. Id. at 2656.
248. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
249. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656-57. 
250. Id. at 2669; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.”); id. at 350 (“[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political
speech based on the speaker’s identity.”). 
251. One of us has previously argued that this principle should extend further and subject
the government to First Amendment scrutiny not only when the government restricts aerial
or other image capture in order to block certain speakers from speaking about a certain topic,
but also when the government’s aim is solely to prevent observers from gaining knowledge
about their environment. See Blitz, supra note 197, at 183-91 (arguing that intermediate
scrutiny should apply when the government’s purpose is to prevent knowledge gained from
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Moreover, under Sorrell, the government runs afoul of the First
Amendment not only when it tries to silence a particular speaker or
viewpoint, but also when it discriminates against a speaker or view-
point by intentionally subjecting it to burdens not imposed on other
speakers or views. “The State may not burden the speech of” those
it dislikes “in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”252
Consequently, even where the bar on an environmental group’s
drone use near a possible pollution site was a limited, rather than
a complete, ban, if the government’s aim is disadvantaging such a
group vis-à-vis companies the group opposes in a particular debate,
then such a bar is still problematic under the First Amendment.253
As discussed above, there are several characteristics of drone
image or video capture that might be relevant to First Amendment
expression and therefore its protection, but each has serious compli-
cations. Indeed, in some cases, those complications might be so
significant as to render the characteristic ultimately unhelpful, or
at least leave it doing relatively little work on the margins. But two
points are very clear: (1) some drone image and video capture must
receive First Amendment protection and (2) even unprotected activi-
ty can receive First Amendment protection if the government has a
censorial purpose. Part IV thus turns to what might be the scope
and manner of this First Amendment protection when it comes to
drone flight.
“information-gathering activity consist[ing] solely of glancing at or snapping a photograph of
something that can be observed in the public space”). Jane Bambauer similarly argues that
“[w]hen a law or regulation has the very purpose of limiting knowledge, the restriction must
undergo First Amendment scrutiny.” Bambauer, supra note 206, at 87.
252. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
253. Ashutosh Bhagwat has recently set forth a similar proposal in a framework he
proposes for analyzing the First Amendment status not only of videorecording and
audiorecording but also of other “antecedent act[s] of producing speech.” Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2015). A key question, he says, is
whether the social harm that government is targeting when it restricts videorecording (or
other speech creation) is “unrelated to the message or communicative impact” of the speech
it makes possible. Id. at 1063. Where it is, he argues, it might be permissible because—
although it is content-based—its goal is not simply to thwart a particular message or prevent
an audience from experiencing a particular visual communication. Id. For example, a drone
law might permissibly bar videorecording at a crime or accident scene where it interferes with
police officers’ ability to do their work effectively. Id. What it may not do, by contrast, would
be to selectively restrict drone cameras to certain kinds of information in order to prevent the
message they make possible.
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FORUM DOCTRINE
In mapping out the constitutional boundaries of government
regulation of private drone use, an area of First Amendment juris-
prudence that is potentially applicable—and in any case illuminat-
ing—is forum doctrine. This Part explains why, and if so, how,
forum doctrine might restrict speech-burdening regulations of drone
activities. Of course, applying forum doctrine to navigable airspace
is novel, and there are other qualifications to doing so that are
discussed below. For now, it suffices to observe that if forum doc-
trine does not apply in this context, then courts will need to develop
some doctrine that serves the same function of determining the
extent to which the government can exclude speech-related activ-
ities from the airspace it controls. Before developing an entirely new
framework, it is certainly worth considering an established one that
may give doctrinal guidance, if not definitive answers. To this end,
the framework of forum doctrine is particularly useful. As this
Article concludes, forum doctrine sets out the minimum First
Amendment standards that may apply to UAV regulations that
burden speech. It therefore provides both the floor of protection for
speech-related private UAV activities, and by default the ceiling of
Fourth Amendment protection against public UAV surveillance once
private cameras in the skies become increasingly common and
privacy expectations against what they can capture become
correspondingly less reasonable.
A. Forum Classifications and Tests
Today, the general public may take for granted a right to engage
in expressive activities on streets, parks, and other public places,
having in mind perhaps the iconic marches and rallies of the Civil
Rights era, if not more recent parades, protests, and other political
and cultural events around the country. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, however, the Court viewed government owner-
ship of public property as dispositive of its “right to absolutely
exclude all right to use” such property, including use for expressive
activities.254 The Court only began extending First Amendment
254. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
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protection to public property in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, alongside its emerging recognition that certain public spaces
such as parks, streets, and sidewalks “have immemorially been held
in trust for use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussion of public questions.”255
Forum doctrine is the First Amendment framework developed by
the Court to govern speech regulations on public property. Although
still evolving—and potentially complex, unclear, and confusing in
some respects256—the basic contours of the doctrine are fairly
settled. As a general matter, forum doctrine divides government
property into different kinds of “free speech zones.” Government
properties of the sort described above—parks, streets, and side-
walks—are considered to be “traditional public forums,” which
“occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection
because of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”257
In traditional public forums, a regulation that burdens speech on
the basis of content (a “content-based regulation”) triggers strict
scrutiny, the most stringent test in constitutional law. The regula-
tion must be no more restrictive of speech than necessary to
advance a compelling government interest.258 A regulation that
burdens speech for reasons other than the message (a “content-
neutral regulation”) still must satisfy a form of heightened, or
intermediate, scrutiny. Such a regulation—often limiting speech on
the basis of time (e.g., daytime), place (e.g., away from doorways and
driveways), or manner (e.g., below a certain decibel level), and thus
commonly labeled a “time, place, or manner” regulation—must be
narrowly tailored to promote a significant government interest.259
255. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
256. See infra Part IV.A.1-2; see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:
The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1716 (1987) (decrying the
“complex maze of categories and subcategories which constitute modern public forum
doctrine” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
257. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 2529-35. These public forum standards—intermediate scrutiny for content-
neutral regulations and strict scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-based regulations—mirror
the approach the Court has adopted outside the context of forum doctrine, when the
government is regulating speech generally rather than on its own property. See Turner Broad.
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
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The Court has rejected arguments to update the category of tradi-
tional public forums to protect modern spaces where the public may
assemble and exchange ideas, including public airports260 and
Internet terminals.261 The primary reason the Court has given in
each instance—through narrow majority or plurality opinions by
former Chief Justice Rehnquist—is that such modern spaces “hardly
qualif[y] for the description of having ‘immemorially ... time out of
mind’ been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expres-
sive activity.”262 Of course, such wooden reasoning is ripe for
criticism that it would freeze the protections afforded by forum
doctrine to nineteenth-century gathering places, rather than pro-
moting the underlying principle that “in a free nation citizens must
have the right to gather and speak.”263 We will return to this
reasoning—and criticism—as we consider the proper forum classif-
ication for navigable airspace below.
Although traditional public forums are, by these precedents,
historically limited in kind, in theory the government may open up
any public property generally for speech. By expressly and inten-
tionally doing so, the government creates a “designated public
forum” and voluntarily subjects that property to the same robust
speech protections as traditional public forums.264 But unlike tradi-
tional public forums, which arise from their historical role as hosts
to free speech rather than from regulatory beneficence—and which
therefore must remain open as public forums as long as the
properties exist in their traditional forms—the government may
close at will any designated public forum that it chooses to open.265
Given the voluntary and demanding nature of designated public
forums, it is hardly surprising that examples are sparse. As one
260. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1992).
261. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
262. Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939)); see also Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205 (plurality) (refusing to classify Internet
access in public libraries as public forums because, “[f]irst, this resource—which did not exist
until quite recently—has not ‘immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, ... been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions’” (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 679)).
263. Lee, 505 U.S. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 698
(“[O]ur failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be
appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our expressive activity.”).
264. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
265. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1985).
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example, the Court appears to have recognized that a municipal
auditorium and theater “designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities” by the general public was a designated public forum.266
Finally, all other forms of government property—which is to say,
most government property—are “limited public forums” or “nonpub-
lic forums.” These properties have not served as sites for public
speech and assembly from time immemorial, nor have they been
opened generally for expressive activities. Examples abound, from
public airports267 to post offices268 and public workplaces269 to public
schools.270 For limited public forums or nonpublic forums, speech
restrictions simply must be “reasonable” and “viewpoint neutral”
(i.e., not favoring one side of an issue over another).271 Reasonable-
ness is assessed “in light of the purpose served by the forum.”272 A
regulation need not be “the most reasonable or the only reasonable”
regulation possible.273
266. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975); see Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (discussing Southeastern Promotions).
Similarly, a policy that makes a public auditorium in Oklahoma City available for rental to
the general public likely constitutes a designated public forum, and therefore rental of the
facility for a “black mass” may not be denied without running afoul of the First Amendment
as content- and viewpoint-based discrimination. See William Crum, Oklahoma City Stance
on “Black Mass” Upsets Catholic Archbishop, THE OKLAHOMAN (July 16, 2014), http://newsok.
com/oklahoma-city-stance-on-black-mass-upsets-catholic-archbishop/article/5004625 [http://
perma.cc/X8KZ-XHC2].
267. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 677-83.
268. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-30 (1990).
269. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-806.
270. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001). In the contexts
of public schools and public employment, the Court has developed specialized tests for
determining the extent to which speech may be regulated, See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (protecting student speech in the absence
of evidence that suppression is “necessary to avoid material and substantial interference” with
a school’s pedagogical mission); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing
interests of employee in “commenting on matters of public concern” versus interests of
employer in “promoting the efficiency of public services”). These tests essentially define when
the government acts reasonably in restricting speech to preserve public workplaces and
schools for their intended uses as limited public forums. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685-88 (2010) (considering Tinker and other public school cases as
limited public forum cases); see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (10th
Cir. 2004) (same).
271. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 678-79 n.11.
272. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
273. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808.
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Before considering the applicability of forum doctrine to navigable
airspace, this Article notes several questions about the framework
in order to set aside those that do not bear consideration as well as
to prepare the way for those that do.
1. Limited Public Forums and Nonpublic Forums
First, there is a question about terminology. As is apparent from
the above discussion, classification of government property as one
type of forum or another is critical for determining the amount of
discretion the government has to burden speech on that property.
For that reason, it is particularly unfortunate that the Court has not
used its own forum labels in a clear and consistent manner.
Foremost, the Court’s terminology over the third category of gov-
ernment property—neither traditional nor designated public
forums—appears to have evolved from classification in earlier case
law as “nonpublic forums” to more recent labeling as “limited public
forums.” For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association, a foundational case wherein the Court set
out what has come to be known as its “forum trichotomy,” the Court
referred to the third category as a “nonpublic forum” rather than a
“limited public forum.”274 In another 1980s case, Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, the Court similarly
referred to government property that was neither a traditional nor
a designated public forum as a “nonpublic forum.”275 In nonpublic
forums, the Court observed, the government “may reserve the forum
for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”276
Somewhat confusingly, in both of those cases, the Court rejected
arguments by speakers that the government had created limited
public forums.277 From the Court’s discussion, it appears the Court
274. 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
275. 473 U.S. at 800.
276. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (“Control over access to a nonpub-
lic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”).
277. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
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treated those arguments as attempts to classify the properties at
issue—public school teacher mailboxes in Perry and a federal
workplace fundraising campaign in Cornelius—as designated public
forums subject to the same stringent standards as traditional public
forums.278 Adding to the confusion, in more recent cases, the Court
has failed to mention “nonpublic forum” as a category in its forum
framework, and instead has described property that is neither a
traditional nor a designated public forum as a “limited public for-
um.” For example, in the 2009 case of Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, the Court referred to the mailboxes at issue in Perry as
a limited public forum, subject to the same standard of reasonable-
ness and viewpoint neutrality that it had articulated in Perry for
nonpublic forums.279 And in 2010, seeming to cement its realign-
ment of labels—albeit in a footnote, and without acknowledgment
or explanation for its evolved terminology—the Court set out its
forum framework as follows:
In conducting forum analysis, our decisions have sorted govern-
ment property into three categories. First, in traditional public
forums, such as public streets and parks, “any restriction based
on the content of ... speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.” Second, governmental entities create
designated public forums when “government property that has
not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally
opened up for that purpose;” speech restrictions in such a forum
“are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a
traditional public forum.” Third, governmental entities establish
“limited public forums by opening property limited to use by
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain
subjects”.... “[i]n such a forum, a governmental entity may
impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral.”280
278. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48.
279. 555 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2009).
280. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678-79 n.11 (2010) (citations
omitted). However, the Court unsettled the state of terminology again in 2015, when it
seemed to return to using “limited public forum” to describe a subclass of designated public
forums reserved “for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics,” and resurrected
the “nonpublic forum” label to describe what the more recent cases have called “limited public
forums.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2259, 2250-52
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Understandably, lower courts and commentators—including the
authors of this Article—differ over the proper labels for the Court’s
forum framework, and in particular over whether “limited public
forum” and “nonpublic forum” describe the same category.281 But
this Article need not stake out a definitive position in this dispute,
for it is at least common ground from the Court’s case law describing
“nonpublic forums” and “limited public forums” that “the test for
both would be the same: government regulation is allowed if it is
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”282 For the sake of simplicity, this
Article will use the term “limited public forum” to describe govern-
ment property that is not open to the public generally for expression
either by tradition or designation.
2. Reasonableness and Forum Purpose
This solution to the question of terminology—treating nonpublic
forums and limited public forums as essentially the same for prac-
tical purposes, because whatever else might be argued about their
interchangeability, the Court has so far assigned the same test to
them—highlights two additional questions about the Court’s forum
framework that need to be addressed before applying it to navigable
airspace. Since the touchstone for assessing speech-burdening
regulations in limited public forums is “whether they are reasonable
in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves,”283 it is
essential to understand what reasonableness means in the context
of forum analysis, as well as how to determine a forum’s purpose.
As to reasonableness, it is important at the outset to clarify what
it does not appear to be: traditional rational basis review. Although
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
281. See Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV.
299, 300 (2009) (describing how efforts to define the components of forum doctrine remain
“startlingly unclear” and have bred confusion and “[c]onfessions of uncertainty” by lower
courts). Compare DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 171-72 (3d ed. 2010) (describing
three forum categories: “traditional,” “limited,” and “nonpublic”), with ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1166-67 (4th ed. 2011) (describing four
possible forum categories: “traditional,” “designated,” “limited,” and “nonpublic,” but
recognizing that the Court may have “collapsed nonpublic forums into the category of limited
public forums”).
282. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 281, at 1166.
283. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
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the Court uses “reasonable” and “rational” interchangeably in cases
applying rational basis review,284 the reasonableness review that the
Court conducts in the context of First Amendment forum analysis
differs in material respects from the deferential rationality review
that it applies to Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process claims when no fundamental rights (such as free speech) or
suspect classifications (such as racial minorities) are burdened.
First, under rational basis review, the Court considers “every
conceivable basis” that might support a challenged law, even those
the legislature did not articulate or rely on, and will uphold the law
as long as there is some legitimate basis that the law rationally
advances.285 By contrast, in conducting forum analysis, the Court
measures the reasonableness of a regulation not against an entire
universe of conceivable justifications that it might advance, but
against only the intended purposes of the property.286
Second, under traditional rational basis review, the legislature
very well may (and often does) discriminate on the basis of view-
point. For example, Congress may pass legislation promoting one
policy view over another, such as providing foreign aid to emerging
democracies but not to entrenched dictatorships. But under First
Amendment forum analysis, viewpoint-based burdens on speech are
suspect across the board, including in limited public forums, for the
government generally may not “suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view.”287
284. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”) (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 315 (quotations omitted). 
286. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
287. Id. It is not entirely clear whether the requirement of viewpoint neutrality is separate
from the reasonableness requirement and admits of no exception, as the Court’s conjunctive
and categorical language sometimes appears to suggest, see, for example, Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[T]he Court has permitted restrictions
on access to a limited public forum ... with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”) (emphasis added), or whether a viewpoint-based restric-
tion may be permitted if—and only if—it is ultimately reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the limited public forum, as the Court appears to have decided in certain contexts,
such as public schools, see, for example, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007)
(upholding school policy banning student speech advocating illegal drug use), and arguably
public funding, see, for example, National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582-
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Third, given the above two distinctions, it should not be
surprising—but is nonetheless worth emphasizing—that reason-
ableness review in the context of forum analysis, unlike rational
basis review in other contexts, does not appear to accord govern-
ment regulation a “strong presumption” of validity.288 No Court
cases assessing speech-burdening restrictions in nonpublic forums
or limited public forums expressly afford such strong deference.
Rather, and perhaps not surprisingly given that a fundamental
right is at issue, the Court’s reasonableness inquiry in the context
of forum analysis appears to demand an independent assessment of
whether the regulation at issue can be said to be reasonable “in the
light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circum-
stances.”289
Finally, given that the reasonableness of a speech-burdening
regulation in a limited public forum is measured against the pur-
pose served by the property, it is critical to understand how that
purpose is determined. Unfortunately, the Court has not made this
clear. For some limited public forums, any explanation for the
Court’s determination of the property’s purpose hardly seems neces-
sary, as it is fairly obvious. For schools, the purpose is self-evidently
education, and so the reasonableness of speech-burdening restric-
tions are judged by whether they are “reasonably related to legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns,”290 or whether the speech at issue
threatens “material and substantial interference with schoolwork
or discipline.”291 For airports, the purpose is self-evidently air travel,
and so regulations are reasonable if they “assure that travelers are
583, 586 (1998) (upholding arts funding based partly on criteria of “decency and respect” as
consistent with “esthetic judgments” appropriate “[i]n the context of arts funding,” and not
presenting “a realistic danger” of “invidious viewpoint discrimination” that would “compro-
mise First Amendment values”) (emphasis added). See Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist.
R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 2002) (siding with circuit courts that read Hazelwood School
District v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), to permit viewpoint-based restrictions on student
speech in school-sponsored activities “so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns”); see also FARBER, supra note 281, at 185 (contending that,
“for all practical purposes,” the Court’s elaborate forum framework boils down to the simple
principle that “the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the subject matter of
speech (or the like) in light of the designated purpose of the facility”).
288. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314 (1993).
289. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
290. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
291. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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not interfered with unduly.”292 For post offices, the purpose is self-
evidently to send mail, and so the reasonableness of a regulation is
assessed in light of its promotion of the “efficient and effective postal
delivery.”293
In other contexts, public property that was obviously created to
serve a primary nonspeech related purpose ends up taking on a
First Amendment function as well. For example, “the principle pur-
pose of streets and sidewalks ... is to facilitate transportation,” but
their suitability as places for citizens to congregate and commun-
icate have turned them into “quintessential public forums.”294
Limited public forums may also serve important, if sometimes
secondary, speech-related purposes. But the functions of limited
public forums sometimes are not so easy to define and often are
vigorously disputed. In such cases, the Court’s approach seems to
be ad hoc and fact-specific, considering the “characteristic nature
and function of the particular forum involved”295 in light of the
record and the parties’ contentions, usually starting with the
government’s assertion of the function of the forum, and considering
applicable policies and practices that may reinforce, refine, or refute
that assertion. For example, in two of the leading cases discussed
above, the Court ultimately accepted the government’s characteriza-
tion of its property—teacher mailboxes reserved exclusively for
“school-related business” in Perry,296 and a workplace fundraising
campaign limited to “traditional health and welfare charities” in
Cornelius297—after first assessing it against a history of policies and
practices that arguably, but not entirely, supported the govern-
ment’s position. Though not treating the government’s position as
“dispositive in itself” in defining the function of the forum,298 the
Court in these and other limited public forum cases often starts and
ends with it.
Of course, it makes some sense to give weight to the govern-
ment’s view of its property’s function. After all, outside the context
292. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992).
293. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990).
294. Lee, 505 U.S. at 696-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
295. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732 (quotations omitted).
296. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983).
297. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
298. Id. at 805.
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of traditional public forums, the government has the discretion to
choose whether to open its property to speech generally by creating
a designated public forum, or preserve its property for narrower or
nonspeech related purposes as a limited public forum. The govern-
ment’s view as to what it has chosen is therefore certainly relevant
to a determination of the property’s intended use. It obviously
makes little sense, however, to defer completely to the government’s
characterization, for the government could then tailor the intended
purposes of the forum to exclude speakers and views with which it
disagrees.
For instance, it would seem imminently reasonable for the gov-
ernment to limit the use of school facilities—including teacher
mailboxes—to official school business, and thereby exclude commu-
nications from nonschool speakers, as “subject matter and speaker
identity” are “inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a
nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose
of the property.”299 But it would seem highly objectionable for the
government to dedicate its school facilities to speech supportive of
school policy and administration, and thereby exclude communica-
tions critical of the school, because the government may not exclude
speech from its property simply to “discourage one viewpoint and
advance another.”300 Yet it is not entirely clear why the Court in
Perry saw that case as the former rather than the latter sort and
consequently permitted the school to allow an official union but not
a critical rival union to communicate through the teacher mail-
boxes.301 Similarly, in other difficult cases, whether the Court
accepts the government’s formulation of its forum’s purposes or
describes it differently ultimately seems to turn on no more than
“the rule of five”302—that is, whether a majority sees it the same way
as the state does.303 Fortunately, it seems the core purpose of
299. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
300. Id.
301. The dissenting four Justices in Perry vigorously contended that the school’s exclusive-
access policy was adopted to “amplify the speech” of the official union, which lobbied for it,
“while repressing the speech” of the rival union “based on the [latter’s] point of view.” Id. at
65-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. RICHARD H. SEAMON ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT SOURCEBOOK 467 (2013) (discussing
Justice Brennan’s catechism of law clerks on “the most important rule in constitutional law”).
303. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (same way);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (not).
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navigable airspace—safe and efficient flight, as discussed below—is
neither difficult to determine nor disputed. The reasonableness of
speech-burdening restrictions on UAV operations therefore should
be assessed in light of that purpose.
Having set out the principles of and problems with the Court’s
forum framework, we now apply it to navigable airspace to delineate
the First Amendment constraints it imposes on the regulation of
UAV operations.
B. Classifying Navigable Airspace
The First Amendment framework of forum doctrine would be
entirely irrelevant to UAV regulation if the space in which they
fly—and which the FAA and other government entities seek to reg-
ulate—were private rather than public property. There is venerable,
though no longer viable, authority for this view with respect to air-
space over private land. The Roman law maxim cujus est solum ejus
est usque ad coelom, translated roughly to mean “whoever owns
the soil owns to heaven above,” established itself as the prevailing
theory of airspace ownership under English and American com-
mon law thanks to endorsements from Lord Coke and Sir William
Blackstone.304 But the rise of manned flight gave the maxim “hither-
to unsuspected significance,” for it implied that it would be a tres-
pass to fly over another’s property.305
Consequently, at the advent of the aviation age, Congress sought
to displace this view of airspace ownership by declaring in the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 and the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act that
“[t]he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of air-
space of the United States,”306 and concurrently exercising that
sovereignty to grant “a public right of transit through the navigable
airspace.”307 The Supreme Court firmly backed this sovereign asser-
tion in the seminal case of United States v. Causby.308 In considering
whether the low-altitude flights of military aircraft over a certain
304. Colin Cahoon, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L.
& COM. 157, 161-62 (1990).
305. Leo Jaffe, Air Law—Trespass by Airplane, 9 TEX. L. REV. 240, 241 (1931).
306. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012).
307. Id. § 40103(a)(2); see DOLAN & THOMPSON II, supra note 73, at 2.
308. 328 U.S. 256, 261, 266 (1946).
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chicken farm (literally scaring the chickens to death) constituted a
taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the Court first
rejected any claim of private ownership over the navigable airspace
claimed by the above acts of Congress.309 The Court stated that
“[c]ommon sense revolts at the idea” that private property owners
could clog the “public highway[s]” of navigable airspace with
trespass claims.310 Repudiating the Roman maxim above as having
“no place in the modern world,” the Court declared that “airspace,
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain.”311
While Causby unambiguously deemed navigable airspace to be
“part of the public domain,” it did not clear up all questions of
ownership and regulatory authority over airspace above private
property.312 Foremost, Congress at the time defined navigable air-
space to be “airspace above minimum safe altitudes of flight pre-
scribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority,” which that agency
determined for air carriers to be above 500 feet for daytime flight
and 1000 feet for nighttime flight.313 Congress has since expanded
the definition of navigable airspace over which the United States is
sovereign to include not only “the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations,” but also any “airspace needed to ensure
safety in the taking off and landing of aircraft.”314 This expanded
definition potentially encompasses “the immediate reaches above
the land,” which the Court in Causby defined to include “at least as
much of the space above the ground as [the landowner] can occupy
or use in connection with the land,” and which the Court apparently
deemed to be “apart” from the public domain.315 Thus, it is not clear
that Congress could validly claim sovereignty over the entirety of
309. Id. at 260-62.
310. Id. at 261; cf. Owen Anderson & John D. Pigott, Seismic Technology and Law:
Partners or Adversaries, 24 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 285, 390-93 (2004) (arguing that aerial
magnetic surveys of underground mineral sources do not violate property rights of land and
mineral owners below).
311. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261, 266.
312. Id. at 266 (deferring the determination of the “precise limits” of public airspace and
private land).
313. Id. at 263 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 180) (repealed 1983).
314. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012).
315. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264, 266 (internal citation omitted).
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this expanded airspace without compensating private property
owners for taking the immediate reaches of their property.316
The expanded definition of navigable airspace acquires unantici-
pated significance with the advent of UAVs. The FAA considers
UAVs to be “aircraft” subject to its regulatory jurisdiction,317 and
smaller UAVs can take off and land from any park, street, or side-
walk, as well as from any private property, including anyone’s
backyard.318 If the UAV-navigable airspace above these properties
is in the public domain, then the relevant First Amendment frame-
work for assessing restrictions on speech-related uses arguably
would be forum doctrine.
To be clear, the First Amendment would apply to any regulation
of UAVs that burden speech, regardless of whether those restric-
tions occur on private or public property.319 But to the extent regula-
tors could claim that navigable airspace is public property—and
moreover limited rather than traditional or designated public
forums—they could justify any regulation burdening speech under
the relatively relaxed criterion of reasonably relating to the preser-
vation of airspace as a “public highway.”
The grounds for viewing most navigable airspace as limited public
forums are not insubstantial. First, if the category of traditional
public forums is restricted to those public properties that have
played an essential historical role in hosting public assembly and
debate, then it can hardly be said that navigable airspace above the
immediate reaches of anyone’s property qualifies.320 Birds may have
316. See id. at 263 (noting hypothetically that lowering navigable airspace to eighty-three
feet “would have presented the question of the validity of the regulation”).
317. See FAA, NOTICE 8900.313, EDUCATION, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT OF
UNAUTHORIZED UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATORS, App. B-5—B-6 (2014), http://www.
faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.313.pdf [http://perma.cc/6WC9-BZ7G] [here-
inafter FAA, NOTICE].
318. An FAA representative has thus urged that “by definition” UAVs “have extended the
national airspace down to the ground.” Gregory S. McNeal, The Federal Government Thinks
Your Backyard Is National Airspace and Toys Are Subject to FAA Regulations, FORBES
(Nov. 18, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/11/18/the-federal-
government-thinks-your-backyard-is-national-airspace-and-toys-are-subject-to-faa-
regulations/ [http://perma.cc/4VQF-TZQM].
319. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58; cf. Blitz, supra note 197, at 186 (noting the
need for a transformation to existing public forum doctrine that would allow Google and
others documenting our environment to access “not only the streets and parks on the ground,
but the pathways that allow them to map and image our public spaces from the air”).
320. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
124 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:049
flown there from “time out of mind,” but not flags. Second, it is
difficult to argue that navigable airspace above the immediate
reaches of land constitutes a designated public forum. Like public
airports, Congress set aside navigable airspace initially for “pas-
senger air travel,” and now for general UAV usage as well, but not
for “promoting the free exchange of ideas.”321 To effectuate this
purpose, Congress delegated authority to the FAA to regulate navi-
gable airspace in order “to ensure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient use of airspace.”322 Accordingly, navigable airspace above
the immediate reaches of the land is most properly viewed for First
Amendment purposes as a limited public forum devoted principally
not to disseminating speech but to promoting and protecting flight.
It is less clear how to classify navigable airspace within the
immediate reaches of the land, such as the airspace from which
aircraft can take off and land. With respect to small UAVs, much
of this airspace would be located above private property, and
therefore arguably is not in the public domain according to
Causby.323 However, the immediate reaches over parks, streets,
and sidewalks arguably are extensions of those traditional public
forums in which flags, banners, and other expressive elements have
extended historically.324
Certainly, treating an area as ubiquitous as navigable airspace
as any kind of public forum is unprecedented. Case law has not con-
sidered a forum anywhere nearly this expansive and pervasive; even
streets and sidewalks do not come close to blanketing entire com-
munities. It may well be argued that forum doctrine—developed in
an era of ground-based pamphleteering, parades, and protests—was
never designed to scale up to the heights of navigable airspace.
Moreover, classifying such a ubiquitous space as a limited public
forum would allow the government to regulate speech literally over
most of America under the lowest possible First Amendment stan-
dard.325
321. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) (internal
quotations omitted).
322. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012).
323. See supra text accompanying note 315.
324. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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This Article does not take issue with any of these points. Courts
should indeed proceed with caution in considering the applicability
of forum doctrine to navigable airspace rather than applying the
framework woodenly based on the government’s proprietary and
regulatory control over the space. Perhaps, as Justice Stevens has
written in another context, “[i]t would be far wiser to give legislators
an unimpeded opportunity to grapple with these emerging issues
rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitu-
tional constraints.”326
That said, there is considerable practical and theoretical value in
considering how forum doctrine would constrain the regulation of
UAV operations. On a practical level, applying the lowest possible
First Amendment standard to navigable airspace—reasonableness
review in limited public forums—gives regulators much needed
guidance by laying out the constitutional floor of protection for
speech-related UAV operations. No other article of which we are
aware offers any substantial or systematic consideration of the
possible First Amendment restraints on civilian UAV regulations.327
This absence of basic analysis recommends an approach that starts
from the ground up (so to speak) by considering the least rigorous
free speech framework that may apply to the soon-to-be drone-
populated skies. Subsequent works can build on—or if they dis-
agree, build over—the forum analysis set forth in this Article, for its
purpose is to suggest a floor rather than a ceiling for First Amend-
ment protection of speech-related UAV activities.
Accordingly, for the sake of determining that floor, this Article
assumes for the moment that navigable airspace within the immed-
iate reaches of both private property and public forums is, like
navigable airspace above the immediate reaches, a limited public
forum. Under the minimum First Amendment standards applicable
to public property of that kind, any regulation burdening speech
need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the property.328
326. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. When First Amendment issues are raised in the context of discussions of civilian UAV
regulations, they typically discuss the First Amendment protections for newsgathering with-
out any substantial analysis as to whether or how First Amendment doctrine might apply in
the domain of navigable airspace. See, e.g., DOLAN & THOMPSON II, supra note 73, at 17-19.
328. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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C. Regulating UAVs in Navigable Airspace as a Limited Public
Forum
As noted, nearly a century ago, Congress claimed navigable
airspace as sovereign territory in order to grant “a public right of
transit,”329 and has since empowered the FAA with regulatory auth-
ority over such airspace “to ensure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient use of airspace.”330 And in the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012, Congress further specified that the FAA should
formulate “a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration
of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace sys-
tem.”331 These combined legislative directives describe the present
dedicated purpose of navigable airspace to be its safe and efficient
use for “cooperative manned and unmanned flight operations.”332 As
a result, any restrictions on expressive activities in this airspace at
least must be reasonable—though not necessarily optimal—in
serving this purpose and not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
1. Time, Place, or Manner Regulations
It seems fairly easy for UAV regulations to stay within these
minimum First Amendment boundaries. After all, many possible
restrictions on UAV use would reasonably promote the safety and
efficiency of manned or unmanned flight. To these ends, any num-
ber of regulations might reasonably place limits on the altitude,
speed, and weight of UAVs; on their safety features; on their prox-
imity to other aircraft or to airports; on their distance from an
operator; on the qualifications of an operator; and so on. If any such
content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation incidentally bur-
dened the use of UAVs for speech-related activities—for example,
a ban on UAVs flying within a certain radius of airports would
prevent their use for aerial photography within the affected
airspace—it would not run afoul of the First Amendment. Such
restrictions are likely to survive the kind of intermediate scruti-
ny that usually would apply to content-neutral restrictions that
329. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2012).
330. Id. § 40103(b)(1).
331. FMRA § 332(a)(1).
332. Id. § 332(a)(2)(F).
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incidentally burden speech.333 They would therefore pass muster
under the less demanding “reasonableness” review applicable in
limited public forums.334
2. Subject Matter and Speaker-Based Regulations
If navigable airspace is treated as a limited public forum, then the
FAA and other regulators could potentially restrict UAV use based
on the nature of an operator’s message or identity. As the Court has
stated, “a defining characteristic of limited public forums”335 is that
the government may limit access “based on subject matter and
speaker so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum and viewpoint neutral.”336 Thus, as
noted above, the Court in Perry held that a public school may limit
access to teacher mailboxes to groups having official business to
communicate with teachers, including an official teachers’ union but
not an unofficial rival union.337 Similarly, a public school may limit
a valediction to a student, and a government agency may limit
speeches at a conference to a chosen topic.338 These content-based
regulations reasonably preserve the limited public forums at issue
for their dedicated purposes.339 However, the school could not bar
the use of teacher mailboxes for official communications critical of
the school, nor restrict a valediction to views favorable to the school,
and the agency could not limit on-topic speeches to those consistent
with the agency’s views. These restrictions discriminate on the ba-
sis of viewpoint, and in any case do not reasonably promote the
underlying purposes of the forums.
Even though speaker-based and subject-based restrictions might
pass muster in a limited public forum in theory, in practice it is
333. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (holding that a law prohibiting
burning draft cards did not violate the First Amendment because it was content neutral and
narrowly tailored toward a significant government interest).
334. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
335. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681 (2010) (quotations and
alterations omitted).
336. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); see supra note
271 and accompanying text.
337. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
338. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 703 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (giving similar
examples).
339. See id.
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difficult to see how UAV restrictions based on speaker or subject
could avoid raising serious First Amendment concerns. In contrast
to the examples of public schools and government conferences,
Congress has not circumscribed the use of navigable airspace by
UAVs to official government business or to any other limited class
of use, such as commerce, transportation, or security. Instead,
Congress mandated that the FAA “integrat[e] ... civil unmanned
aircraft systems” generally into the national airspace system,
without further limitation as to kind or use.340 Therefore, if a certain
UAV use counts as First Amendment activity, such as photography,
then restricting such use further on the basis of the identity of the
operator (e.g., amateur photographers) or subject matter (e.g.,
photojournalism) would not relate to—much less reasonably pro-
mote—the purpose of preserving navigable airspace for general
and presumably diverse unmanned and manned flight operations.
Rather, at least in light of the broad access contemplated by
Congress, limited so far only by safety considerations, favoring
certain actors or subjects within a type of expressive UAV use for
reasons unrelated to safety would risk repeating the constitutional
infirmity the Court found in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, in which the University of Virginia had
created a limited public forum by funding student publications
generally “to encourage a diversity of views,” but then undermined
that very purpose by denying funding to publications with religious
viewpoints.341
3. Amateur Versus Commercial Use
For the same reason, the FAA’s current ban on commercial UAV
use342 may become problematic, at least when it no longer reasona-
bly serves the purpose of safely integrating UAVs into the national
airspace system. The 2012 law contemplates a “phased-in approach”
340. FMRA § 332(a)(1). Subsection 332(d) is the only part of the law that limits regulatory
development of UAV operations to particular uses. It calls on the FAA to work with other
agencies as well as national and international communities to designate areas and develop
plans for UAV use in the Arctic “for research and commercial purposes.” Id. § 332(d)(1). But
this directive to develop plans for limited UAV use in the Arctic only underscores Congress’s
intent to dedicate the national airspace system for general UAV usage.
341. 515 U.S. 819, 831, 834 (1995).
342. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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to such integration.343 Consistent with this approach, the law imme-
diately allows “hobby or recreational use” of model aircraft (includ-
ing some UAVs) under certain safety conditions,344 and tasks the
FAA with “safely accelerat[ing]” the integration of other UAV uses
(including commercial ones) into the national airspace system.345
Based on this timing dichotomy, as the Pirker case illustrates, the
FAA presently allows “[t]aking photographs with a model aircraft
for personal use,” but not “photographing a property or event and
selling the photos.”346 This categorical distinction is speaker-based,
as the allowance of UAV-based photography of an event (e.g., a
wedding), object (e.g., a lighthouse), or area (e.g., a landscape) turns
on whether the photographer is an amateur or professional.347 At
present, allowing amateur but not professional photography
arguably may be justified on safety grounds; allowing limited uses
of UAVs while delaying broader usage pending further study,
development, and testing of safety rules and technologies seems
reasonable. After all, there is no question that UAV operations pose
safety risks, not only to other aircraft but also to those below.348 But
as the amateur and commercial examples in the preceding note
illustrate, safety concerns are not the unique province of commercial
UAV usage. Indeed, it might seem odd that a twelve-year-old kid
flying a UAV can be assumed to do so safely but a company with
343. FMRA § 332(a)(2)(C).
344. This approach grandfathers in, but alters in several respects, the FAA’s former
voluntary standards for model aircraft use by the hobbyist community. See FAA, ADVISORY
CIRCULAR, supra note 61. Significantly, the 2012 law makes compliance with its safety rules
mandatory.
345. FMRA § 332(a)(1).
346. FAA, NOTICE, supra note 317, at App. B-10.
347. There appears to be demand for UAV-based professional photography, as evidenced
by the rising popularity of drone-based wedding photography. See Marianne Rohlich, Bird?
Plane? No, It’s the Wedding Photographer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/03/fashion/weddings/bird-plane-no-its-the-wedding-photographer.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/AC3H-7T5V].
348. See, e.g., J. David Goodman, Remote-Controlled Model Helicopter Fatally Strikes Its
Operator at a Brooklyn Park, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/
nyregion/remote-controlled-copter-fatally-strikes-pilot-at-park.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
KW76-2SAX]; Emanuella Grinberg & Vivian Kuo, Enrique Iglesias Injured in Concert Mishap
with a Drone, CNN (June 2, 2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/31/entertainment/
enrique-iglesias-drone-feat/index.html [http://perma.cc/NGK4-8DAY]; James Nye, Fail! Pho-
tographer’s Drone Smacks Groom in the Head as He Looked for the Perfect Shot, DAILYMAIL
(Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2395933/Fail-Photographers-drone-
smacks-groom-head-looked-perfect-shot.html [http://perma.cc/AK9X-E6QJ].
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assets, insurance, training, and expertise is held to the contrary
assumption. Accordingly, when—as a result of rulemaking, tech-
nology, or both—it is safe for amateur and commercial UAVs to
share navigable airspace, then it would no longer reasonably
promote the purpose of the forum to allow only the former but not
the latter.
It is too early to judge whether the FAA’s current restriction on
commercial UAV use will survive future First Amendment scrutiny.
There is reason at present for both optimism and caution. On the
optimistic side, the 2012 law permits the FAA to grant exemptions
for UAV operation before it has completed its formal rulemaking for
general UAV usage,349 and the FAA has begun to do so. As widely
reported, the FAA first granted six Hollywood production firms
exemptions to operate UAVs for capturing aerial footage for films.350
Based on the firms’ self-imposed safety conditions (e.g., requiring
operators to hold private pilot certificates, flying strictly within the
line of sight, and operating only on set), as well as additional
requirements imposed by the FAA (e.g., inspecting UAVs before
each flight and operating only in daytime), the agency found the
proposed uses met the statutory criteria of not posing a safety
hazard to other aircraft or the public and not posing a threat to
national security.351 If the FAA proceeds to grant exemptions to
other applicants who can demonstrate a similar level of safe usage,
including, for example, journalists and other commercial photogra-
phers and videographers, then the FAA could credibly argue that its
incremental expansion of commercial UAV operations is reasonable
on safety grounds. If, however, the FAA denies exemptions to future
applicants wishing to use UAVs for other speech-related activities
(e.g., sports photographers and videographers) without a reasonable
349. See FMRA § 333.
350. See Richard Verrier, FAA Gives Drone Exemption to Hollywood Production Firms,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-
hollywood-drones-20140925-story.html [http://perma.cc/U26N-KURU]. The FAA has since
granted exemptions for aerial surveying, construction site monitoring, and oil rig flare stack
inspection, among others, and the pace of exemptions has picked up rapidly. See Press
Release, FAA, FAA Grants Five More Commercial UAS Exemptions (Dec. 10, 2014), http://
www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=17934 [http://perma.cc/Z6QU-HK
BJ]; supra note 54.
351. See Press Release, supra note 23. For the formal orders granting the exemptions, see
FAA, Section 333, supra note 54.
2015] REGULATING DRONES 131
distinction based on safety, then the FAA would open itself up to a
credible First Amendment challenge.352 As the Court cautioned in
Perry, even in a limited public forum, “[w]hen speakers and subjects
are similarly situated, the State may not pick and choose.”353
Ultimately, given Congress’s mandate for the FAA to “safely
accelerate” the integration of civilian drones generally into the na-
tional airspace system, the agency will find it increasingly difficult
as a statutory and constitutional matter to justify grounding
similarly safe UAV operations on the basis of industry, use, or
speech content.
4. Privacy
In the public mind, UAVs can raise the specter not only of death
but also the death of privacy. The Orwellian image of an all-seeing
eye in the sky is approaching technological feasibility,354 and not
coincidentally, it has raised privacy concerns at all levels and across
all branches of government. As described in Part I, such concerns
have prompted state and local privacy-related UAV legislation,
the consideration in Congress of privacy protections against civilian
drone surveillance,355 and the preparation of a White House direc-
tive for federal agencies to disclose their UAV operations and data
collection practices and policies.356 In a recent speech, a Supreme
Court justice remarked that “[t]here are drones flying over the air
randomly that are recording everything that’s happening on what
we consider our private property,” and such “technology has to
stimulate us to think about what is it that we cherish in privacy and
how far we want to protect it and from whom,” including from
corporations and from private citizens.357
352. So far, the FAA seems to be granting exemptions for a wide variety of commercial
uses, including many speech-related ones. See FAA, Authorizations Granted via Section 333
Exemptions, supra note 54.
353. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
354. See, e.g., Timberg, supra note 139.
355. See supra Part I.
356. See Craig Whitlock, White House Plans to Require Federal Agencies to Provide Details
About Drones, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/white-house-plans-to-require-federal-agencies-to-provide-details-about-drones/
2014/09/26/5f55ac24-4581-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html [http://perma.cc/W5QM-Q2VX].
357. Gershman, supra note 187.
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Current federal law, including the 2012 FAA integration require-
ment, does not mention privacy grounds, much less limit UAV oper-
ations on privacy grounds. Until the adoption of legislation doing so,
could the FAA nonetheless regulate civilian UAVs to protect
privacy? The answer is not entirely clear.
On the one hand, as discussed above, the Court’s cases suggest
that the government may not suppress speech that cannot reason-
ably be regarded as interfering with the uses of a limited public
forum for its “intended purposes.”358 For example, with respect to
public schools—whose primary mission is to educate students rather
than to provide a platform for private student speech—the Court
memorably stated that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”359
Accordingly, school officials may not suppress personal student
expression (e.g., a black armband in that case to protest the
Vietnam War) absent a showing that such speech “materially and
substantially interfere[s]” with the school’s teaching mission.360
Likewise, in courthouses,361 government workplaces,362 or other
limited public forums, several cases essentially have required the
government to tolerate speech that does not interfere with the
purposes of those properties. Based on these precedents, private
individuals and corporations whose use of UAVs for photography,
videography, information-gathering, or other speech-related activi-
ties that could raise privacy concerns might argue that the FAA has
no business restricting UAV use based on privacy or any other
concerns unrelated to preserving navigable airspace for safe and
efficient flight operations.363
358. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
359. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). For an explan-
ation of why public schools are properly regarded as a subset of limited public forums, see
supra note 270.
360. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quotations omitted).
361. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (jacket proclaiming “F*** the Draft”
worn in hallway of municipal courthouse).
362. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987) (worker in county constable’s office
remarking to co-worker upon learning about attempted assassination of President Reagan
that “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get him”). 
363. It could be argued that these cases involve the expression of political speech, which
is at the core of First Amendment protection. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (affirming “profound national commitment” embodied in First Amendment “to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). But it
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On the other hand, another line of cases recognizes the authority
of the government to restrict speech-related activities that pose
substantial privacy concerns or otherwise interfere with the use and
enjoyment of adjoining private property. For example, in Frisby v.
Schultz, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting targeted resi-
dential picketing—that is, picketing taking place in front of a single
residence.364 As a general matter, the Court observed that the gov-
ernment’s “interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society.”365 With respect to targeted residential picketing,
the Court also recognized an “important aspect of residential priva-
cy” to be the “protection of the unwilling listener,” who is “captive”
in the home, from speech that “inherently and offensively intrudes
on residential privacy.”366
Additionally, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court upheld
regulations controlling sound volume at the band shell in Central
Park partly based on the government’s “substantial interest” in
protecting residential neighborhoods from “unwelcome noise.”367
These cases involve speech in public forums, but their recognition
of substantial regulatory interests in protecting residential privacy
and tranquility applies with full force to the less speech-protective
category of limited public forums.368
is far from clear that nonpolitical speech is any less protected than political speech under the
Court’s modern case law. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4 (2011)
(stating that “[r]eading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying
than playing Mortal Kombat,” but “these cultural and intellectual differences are not
constitutional ones,” for “[e]ven if we can see in them nothing of any possible value to society,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature”) (quotations
and ellipse omitted); cf. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (stating that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s
lyric,” and therefore “because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area ... the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual”).
In any case, UAVs of course may be used for political speech (e.g., photojournalism or
filmmaking on matters of public concern), and such uses at times may threaten privacy as
much as other image-capturing or information-gathering uses.
364. 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
365. Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
366. Id. at 484, 486.
367. 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
368. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 729 (1970) (upholding statute
permitting homeowners to restrict delivery of offensive materials to their mailboxes); cf.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution,
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”).
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At the least, these cases provide authority for legislation to limit
UAV operations on privacy grounds. They might support rules re-
stricting targeted UAV surveillance of a single residence and
perhaps entire residential neighborhoods, as persistent and focused
aerial monitoring of homes may expose the comings and goings of
residents, as well as outside and inside activities,369 in ways and
degrees (beyond the prying eyes of a nosy neighbor or occasional
satellite image) that “inherently and offensively intrude[ ] on resi-
dential privacy.”370 For the same reason, these cases might also
support duration-based limits on aerial recording—for example, no
longer than half an hour per day over any particular home, which
would meaningfully protect residential privacy while leaving a
reasonable window for speech-related image gathering.371
Alternatively, the FAA might argue that its existing mandate to
ensure “safe operation” of UAVs is sufficiently ambiguous to allow
it to protect those below flying aircraft from privacy harms as well
as physical harms.372 Or, the FAA might argue that Congress’s
direction for it to come up with a “comprehensive plan to safely
accelerate” UAV integration in the national airspace system is
broad enough to permit it to include nonsafety considerations such
as privacy.373 Finally, the FAA might contend that, just as “strict
incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the identity of
the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not
mandated” in order to restrict access, so too a strict relationship
between a speech-burdening regulation and the purpose of the
forum is not necessary as long as the regulation is reasonable in
369. See, e.g., Thomas Jung & Frank Liebelt, Thermography Drone for Aerial Recordings
Using the FLIR T640bx Thermal Imaging Camera, FLIR, http://www.flir.co.uk/cs/display/
?id=60572 [http://perma.cc/YT2V-3AVZ]; cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(holding that police surveillance of a home with even a relatively primitive thermal imager
invades a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and hence constitutes a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
370. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
371. Half an hour is a durational limit that seems reasonable to the four co-authors of this
Article, who hold differing views on the relative values of expression and privacy. That said,
the point is less that this particular duration would pass muster, than that some reasonable
durations should.
372. FMRA § 332(a)(2)(H) (emphasis added).
373. Id. § 332(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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promoting some legitimate or substantial government interest,
including privacy.374
We are skeptical that Congress had privacy in mind when it
ordered the FAA to “safely accelerate” UAV integration into the
national airspace system. The 2012 law is replete with references
to, and requirements for, “safe” UAV operations;375 by contrast, it
does not mention “privacy” at all. As subsequent bills in Congress
have shown, its members are cognizant of the privacy concerns
raised by UAVs and perfectly capable of drafting legislation to
address those concerns directly.376 At most, and perhaps with the
benefit of Chevron deference to the FAA’s administrative exper-
tise,377 the agency might persuade a court (though not the authors)
that the law is ambiguous with respect to whether it delegates to
the agency the authority to regulate UAVs on privacy grounds, and
therefore leaves the agency discretion to do so.378 As for the conten-
tion that any speech-burdening regulation that reasonably promotes
some legitimate or substantial government purpose should pass
muster regardless of whether that purpose is related to the
dedicated function of the limited public forum, the Court itself has
admonished that “[t]he reasonableness of the Government’s restric-
tion of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of
the purpose of the forum.”379
In short, if navigable airspace is treated as a limited public forum,
then the FAA would have regulatory leeway to incidentally or
directly burden speech-related UAV activities if doing so would
reasonably promote safe unmanned and manned flight operations.
The FAA would find itself on firmest ground regulating the time,
place, or manner of UAV operations for safety reasons. The FAA
could also phase in speech-related UAV activities based on speak-
er identity or subject matter as long as such incrementalism is
374. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985).
375. See FMRA § 332.
376. See supra notes 38-39.
377. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
378. It does not seem, however, that the FAA is eager to enter the privacy regulation
business. See Nathan D. Taylor & Adam J. Fleisher, Drone Privacy Issues Increase
Washington’s Focus, LAWFUEL (Jan. 26, 2015) http:/www.lawfuel.com/drone-privacy-issues-
increase-washingtons-focus [http://perma.cc/M4ZA-QUPL] (noting FAA articulation “that its
mission ‘does not include regulating privacy’ ”).
379. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (emphasis added).
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reasonably related to safety and not viewpoint-based. For example,
permitting only amateur operations until the adoption of safety
rules or technologies makes it safe to allow wider commercial utili-
zation of navigable airspace. However, given Congress’s goal of
opening up navigable airspace for general UAV usage, the FAA
must eventually allow all speech-related UAV activities regardless
of subject matter or speaker identity as long as those activities
satisfy generally applicable safety regulations. Finally, and perhaps
surprisingly, the FAA does not appear to have the general regula-
tory authority, even in the speech-restrictive setting of a limited
public forum, to restrict UAV uses that pose privacy rather than
safety concerns. Congress likely needs to identify privacy as a rele-
vant regulatory interest in the national airspace system before the
FAA may regulate to protect those below from prying eyes as well
as from falling aircraft. It should do so, and promptly.
Of course, urging Congress to identify privacy as a regulatory
interest for the national airspace system is not the same as
suggesting that such a legislative declaration would be free from
constitutional constraints or would resolve all doctrinal difficulties
with the Court’s “incompletely theorized” framework of forum
analysis.380 Indeed, whether as part of national or local legisla-
tion—the former of which is preferable for reasons of uniformity and
efficiency—an assertion of privacy as a regulatory interest would
raise additional questions within the forum framework. Foremost,
could navigable airspace even be redefined legislatively to include
privacy within its regulatory dimensions? On the one hand, as
discussed above, apart from traditional public forums, the govern-
ment has great leeway to dedicate its property for its intended uses,
and its definition of those uses has been accorded substantial, if not
dispositive, weight.381 Furthermore, if the government could rely on
a general regulatory interest in residential privacy to limit expres-
sive activities even in the robust speech zones of traditional public
forums,382 then it seems likely that courts would sanction the legis-
lative adoption of privacy as a regulatory goal for navigable air-
space as a limited public forum.
380. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1736 (1995).
381. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 366-71 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the “characteristic nature and function of the
particular forum involved” also play a role in defining the dedicated
purposes of the forum at issue,383 and under the seemingly ad hoc
totality of circumstances approach the Court has taken, relevant
considerations arguably include historical and contemporary uses
of the forum as well as its physical characteristics.384 And in the case
of navigable airspace, the very characteristics that make it a threat
to privacy—the literally and figuratively heightened view it offers
of property, people, and activities below—are also those that make
it particularly valuable and increasingly popular for image capture,
information-gathering, and other potentially speech-related UAV
uses. At the least, therefore, if navigable airspace continues to grow
more “suitable for discourse”385 as UAV technology advances and
their speech-related uses become more common, then courts should
hesitate to approve any legislative assertion of privacy so broad as
to leave little room for citizens to produce speech—if not directly to
“gather and speak”386—in such a unique and extensive forum as the
skies. For even under the reasonableness test applicable to limited
public forums, if the “characteristic nature and function” of naviga-
ble airspace include its suitability as a situs for speech production
alongside legislatively defined purposes such as safety and privacy,
then regulations that fail to reasonably balance the expressive
potential of the forum against legitimate safety and privacy con-
cerns strike us as problematic.
Consider, for example, a flat ban on UAV image gathering. For
starters, if the legislative background only recognizes safety as a
regulatory interest—as is currently the case with respect to the
national airspace system—it is doubtful that such a speech-
burdening ban could survive even reasonableness review. It would
be difficult to argue that the privacy-protective rule would relate to,
much less be reasonable in light of, the dedicated purpose of the
forum. But if navigable airspace could be redefined to include priva-
cy protection as a dimension, then the ban would stand on a firmer
383. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1989) (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 650-51 (1981)).
384. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment).
385. Id. at 698.
386. Id. at 696.
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constitutional footing. Whether such a ban ultimately would survive
First Amendment scrutiny would depend, in our view, on whether
the expressive potential of the forum is considered an inherent and
indefeasible part of its purpose, and therefore one of the guideposts
for determining reasonableness. If not, then the ban should survive,
as it more than reasonably promotes one of the dedicated purposes
of the forum without undermining any other. But if so, then the
severe imbalance between its bolstering of privacy and its burdening
of speech should render the ban at least constitutionally suspect if
not clearly unsound.
Alternatively, consider a more modest legislative response to
privacy concerns raised by civilian UAV usage. Suppose that the
FAA, with an appropriate legislative mandate to address privacy as
well as safety, and the acquisition of expertise in both privacy and
free speech, (1) channels UAV image gathering to a dedicated “eye
zone” in navigable airspace between the ground and 500 feet over
public parks, streets, and sidewalks, and between 300 and 500 feet
over private property, (2) imposes a durational limit of half an hour
of recording per day over a private residence, and (3) restricts image
gathering to cameras without telephoto or other sense-enhancing
capabilities.387 This content-neutral time, place, and manner regula-
tion arguably strikes a reasonable constitutional balance between
the protection of privacy—ultimately, not ceding much more than
the Fourth Amendment flyover cases already have done—and the
preservation of ample aerial space for unique and valuable speech-
productive First Amendment activities.
The larger point here is not to promote one model of legislation
over another, or to “bet the farm” on this preliminary assessment of
the constitutionality of these two legislative examples. Rather, these
examples illustrate when and how privacy may support UAV legis-
lation given the important First Amendment interests at stake.
387. Proposed legislation would require drone manufacturers to include technology to
“geofence” drones by height (no higher) and place (no closer). See Consumer Drone Safety Act,
S. 1608, 114th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2015), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/
serve/?File_id=15de3392-f880-4d12-8aef-861ab6455f98 [http://perma.cc/PD7C-TZ8H]. This
sort of technology would facilitate compliance with time, place, or manner restrictions such
as those considered above.
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V. FOURTH AMENDMENT REPRISE
As developed above, as a default matter at least, the Fourth
Amendment includes a public disclosure doctrine that does not
alone require police to shield their eyes.388 Thus, if private persons
are conducting certain drone surveillance and that surveillance is
not contracted for or consented to, then law enforcement will likely
be constitutionally permitted to do the same, without obtaining a
warrant or other judicial preclearance, and without any threshold
level of suspicion. This, along with the private search doctrine and
the third party doctrine, means that as private drone recording
increases, so does law enforcement access to such recording.389
Nothing about this should be too startling, as of course law enforce-
ment is expected to use reasonable means at its disposal to keep
people safe from those who would do harm. But there is always the
question of who watches the watchers, and healthy distrust of
government is as American as apple pie. So, having analyzed what
the First Amendment protections for private flight might be, what
precisely do they indicate for government flight?
Unfortunately, between uncertainty in the First Amendment
right to record, in the applicability as well as application of forum
doctrine, and in what social norms will develop around increasingly
popular and sophisticated UAV technology, it is not yet clear what
default permissions law enforcement will enjoy. To start, it is
unclear what relevance courts might give the reasons behind the
First Amendment privilege. If courts ultimately privilege private
recording of police and other government conduct given its essential
role in deterring or outing government abuse, then such record-
ing arguably would not support any government claim to record the
rest of us.390 On the one hand, the Fourth Amendment public
disclosure principle is not predicated on the reason for the private
access, but rather on the foundational default that if in fact private
388. See supra Part II. 
389. Unless, of course, a legislature restricts private disclosure to law enforcement. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2012) (permitting a public provider to voluntarily disclose elec-
tronic communications to the government only in certain instances).
390. Or would it, if the government convincingly argued that only through more
indiscriminate recording can it more fairly apply laws?
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persons are routinely doing “x,” there is little good reason to prevent
law enforcement from doing the same. But if the only privilege is to
record government actors, then private persons may in fact not
typically be recording private actors.
If First Amendment protections were limited to artistic aerial
image capture, that would seem to have little play for law enforce-
ment and other government recording except it might make record-
ing so commonplace that it would be odd to claim a reasonable
expectation against it. The same is true if only journalists receive
protections given their constitutionally mentioned—and perhaps
ensconced—role as “the press.” And to the extent that the courts
ultimately grant a more universal First Amendment right to record
and gather information, it will indeed shift the Fourth Amendment
default if private persons take to routinely recording.
Hence, this is another ground of uncertainty. To impact the
Fourth Amendment, it is not sufficient that the First Amendment
permits certain private behavior: it is only if that behavior becomes
commonplace that it is unreasonable as a default matter to expect
privacy against the government doing the same. It is possible,
though perhaps not likely in the era of YouTube and social media,
that social norms will develop that sharply restrict drone recording.
For example, even though thermal imagers have been relatively
cheaply available for some time,391 we are not aware of them being
generally used to image other people’s homes, and thus no court has
deviated from Kyllo’s 2001 holding restricting law enforcement
use.392 And backlash against wearers of Google Glass was at least
one reason for it being discontinued in its then-available form.393 On
the other hand, if drones with long flight times, very small size, and
autonomous tracking become routinely available, aerial recording
might become pervasive. People might take to having a private
security or lifelogging drone tail them in public, thereby recording
391. See, e.g., FLIR, http://www.flir.com/flirone/ [http://perma.cc/L776-DVVZ] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015).
392. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
393. See Michael Finney, Backlash Grows over People Wearing Google Glass, ABC7 NEWS
(May 18, 2014), http://abc7news.com/technology/backlash-grows-over-people-wearing-google-
glass/66211/ [http://perma.cc/S5BY-9YX7]; Sam Sanders, Public Sales of Google Glass to End
Later This Month, NPR (Jan. 15, 2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/01/15/377507746/public-sales-of-google-glass-to-end-later-this-month [http://perma.
cc/WV7Z-VV3Y].
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not only their movements but all those with whom they come into
contact. Only time will tell.
Whatever the case, as this Article has developed, the constitu-
tional rights are critically interconnected. Thus, if public forum
doctrine ultimately permits an “eye zone” such as that described
above,394 and if private persons take to routinely flying and record-
ing, then as a default Fourth Amendment matter, law enforcement
would likely be able to fly their drones in the same manner, with the
same cameras, and for the same durations.395 Whatever they could
view in that manner would likely be fair game for federal law
enforcement unless restricted by Congress, and for state law en-
forcement unless restricted by Congress (perhaps indirectly) or the
respective state legislature.
CONCLUSION
We cannot know all the myriad ways in which UAV flight will
change our society: such flight in the United States is in its infancy,
mainly as a hobby or as a closely regulated experiment. It is thus
impossible to predict the different ways social norms may develop
to accommodate the increasing tensions between privacy and
freedom of expression brought about by advances in technology, and
impossible to know how judges, legislators, and administrators will
react. But as this Article demonstrates, there is a constitutional
foundation in both the First and Fourth Amendments upon which
legal actors should build, and those two constitutional rights are
intertwined in an important manner. As a Fourth Amendment
matter, police likely will not be the only ones who cannot fly, and so
to the extent private flight and accompanying surveillance develop
behind a First Amendment shield—including an increasingly recog-
nized right to record—Fourth Amendment restraints upon law
enforcement surveillance will relax correspondingly.
Yet First Amendment protection for speech-related UAV activi-
ties should not be unlimited, because respecting privacy is an
equally important norm. Indeed, the First Amendment itself is
394. See supra Part IV.C.4. 
395. For sources discussing duration-based and magnification limits on government
surveillance, see supra note 104.
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arguably conflicted as greater recording leads to greater amounts of
expression, but can chill freedoms of association and personal
development that make for meaningful expression and deliberative
participation. It will take years for courts and legislatures to fully
sort out this increasingly important public space, and by then nov-
el technologies might necessitate a new round of deliberation. But
as a start, considering the interdependency between the First and
Fourth Amendment principles discussed in this Article, Congress
should explicitly permit airspace regulation for reasons of privacy
as well as safety. That will allow the FAA, if it obtains the necessary
expertise, to promulgate rules that seek to accommodate both the
privacy costs and First Amendment benefits of drone technology.
